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Federal Questions and the Human
Rights Paradigm*
Kenneth C. Randall**
INTRODUCTION
The present decade has witnessed a new and prolific genre
of civil litigation: federal actions concerning human rights vio-
lations committed outside the United States, usually brought by
aliens against other aliens or foreign states. Cases that exem-
plify this type of litigation include an action against a
Paraguayan police officer who tortured a Paraguayan national
to death in Paraguay;' two actions involving human rights vio-
lations by the former military junta in Argentina;2 a class ac-
tion against a Third Reich henchman in Croatia who committed
war crimes and crimes against humanity, executing tens of
thousands of Jews;3 an action on behalf of a Swedish diplomat
whom Soviet officials illegally imprisoned and probably exe-
cuted;4 and various human rights actions against Ferdinand
Marcos, the deposed President of the Philippines.5 Victims of
terrorism also have pursued similar actions.6
* © 1988 by Kenneth C. Randall.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama.
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1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) qff'd on re-
hearing, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argen., No. CV-82-1772 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file) (also alleging expropriation of private property), vacated and dismissed,
order (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985).
3. Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
4. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246
(D.D.C. 1985).
5. See Recent Developments, Alien Tort Claims Act-Act of State Doc-
trine-Act of State Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Human Rights Claims
Brought Against Former Philippine President Residing in the United States,
27 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 433 n.1 (1987) (compiling human rights actions against
Marcos).
6. E.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
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Although these human rights cases appear compelling, the
plaintiffs must nonetheless invoke federal court jurisdiction.
Despite the persistent efforts of human rights advocates, how-
ever, United States courts frequently have held that they lack
subject matter jurisdiction over these cases.7 Although expla-
nations for dismissing the actions have differed, depending
partly on the jurisdictional statute at issue, the result is the
same: the federal courthouse door is closed to the victims of
heinous international law violations.
This Article explores the topic of domestic adjudicatory ju-
risdictions over international human rights violations.9 Those
offenses, committed by either state10 or nonstate actors, include
torture, genocide, summary execution, slavery, apartheid, and
war crimes." This Article also addresses domestic adjudicatory
jurisdiction over cases involving terrorist acts, such as hi-
jacking, hostage taking, and offenses against internationally
(per curiam), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion sponsored terrorist attack on civilian bus in Israel); Letelier v. Republic of
Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980) (action against Chile arising out of ter-
rorists' assassination of former Chilean Ambassador to United States in Wash-
ington, D.C.).
7. Of the cases identified in notes 1-4 and 6, supra, courts sustained juris-
diction in Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878, Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1538, Von Dardel,
623 F. Supp. at 250, and Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 674; courts denied jurisdiction
in Handel, 601 F. Supp. at 1424, Siderman de Blake, and Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
775. Judicial response to the numerous Marcos actions has varied, as Recent
Developments, supra note 5, indicates. A broader sampling of cases shows,
however, that courts reject jurisdiction in the human rights and terrorism con-
text more often than not. See infr- note 49. Even when jurisdiction exists, a
court may choose not to exercise it. See infra note 20.
8. Adjudicatory jurisdiction refers to the legitimate authority of a partic-
ular judicial or administrative tribunal to subject certain actors, things, or
events to its processes. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. A rough
equivalent of that term is subject matter jurisdiction.
9. For other writings by this Author addressing jurisdictional issues in
the context of human rights violations, see Randall, Special U.S. Civil Juris-
diction, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 89 (M. Bassiouni
ed. 1988) [hereinafter Randall, Civil Jurisdiction]; Randall, Universal Juris-
diction under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988) [hereinafter Ran-
dall, Universal Jurisdiction]; Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort
Statute and a Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 473 (1986) [here-
inafter Randall, Further Inquiries]; Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over Inter-
national Law Caaims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Randall, Alien Tort Statute].
10. State will refer to country or nation-state, unless a quoted passage or
this Article indicates otherwise.
11. Regarding the capability of both state and nonstate actors to commit
such acts and terrorism, see infra notes 221, 252-53 and accompanying text.
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protected persons, when those offenses affect the physical in-
tegrity of individual victims.12 This Article will refer to all
such international law violations as human rights claims or
human rights cases. The term human rights paradigm will en-
compass the norms prohibiting such violations.13
In particular, this Article focuses on the extent to which
courts can and should use federal question jurisdiction to up-
hold district court authority over human rights claims. Human
rights law derives primarily from the treaties created following
World War II and from international custom. Both custom and
treaties, at least when recognized in the United States, are part
of federal law14 and thus may give rise to federal questions.
Federal question jurisdiction is codified at 28 U.S.C. section
1331, which provides that the "district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."'15 This Article will refer
12. Political goals or ideological values more "legitimate" than those un-
derlying typical human rights violations sometimes motivate terrorists. For
example, freedom fighters, in an effort to achieve self-determination, may re-
sort to terrorism to further legitimate political goals. In contrast, no legiti-
mate goal justifies human rights violations. See Randall, Further Inquiries,
supra note 9, at 525-27. As part of the United Nations's overall program
against the use of force, however, international law attempts to curtail terror-
ist acts as a means of achieving even legitimate political goals. Several recent
United Nations instruments, promulgated with overwhelming support, reflect
this perspective both by condemning terrorist acts and by soliciting state par-
ticipation in conventions condemning hijacking and other terrorism. E.g., G.A.
Res. 61, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 301, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1986); S.C.
Res. 579, 40 U.N. SCOR (2637th mtg.) at 24, U.N. Doc. S/1NF/41 (1985) (unani-
mously adopted), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 243 (1986). Regardless of its goal, ter-
rorism, like human rights violations, affects the lives and physical integrity of
individuals who often are innocent victims. This Article, then, employs the ru-
bric of human rights claims to encompass cases of both human rights viola-
tions and terrorist acts committed against individuals. See generally Paust,
The Link Between Human Rights and Terrorism and Its Implications for the
Law of State Responsibility, 11 HASTINGS INT'L & COuP. L. REv. 41 (1987).
13. For an explanation of human rights claims, see supra note 12. For a
discussion of the term human rights paradigm, see infra Part IV.
14. The United States Constitution provides that "[t]his Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Treaties are thus expressly part of federal law. The supremacy clause does not
expressly mention customary international law; however, the legal community
agrees that the phrase Laws of the United States includes federal common law.
Because the legal community views custom as similar to, or as part of, federal
common law, international custom also falls within the meaning of laws of the
United States. See Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82
MIcH. L. REV. 1555, 1566 (1984).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
1988]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
to that provision alternatively as federal question jurisdiction,
arising under jurisdiction, or section 1331.
Part I sketches a statutory overview of federal jurisdiction
and human rights cases. The potential importance of section
1331 jurisdiction over such cases will become evident in light of
current interpretations of other jurisdictional provisions.
Part II analyzes the judiciary's diverse interpretations of
arising under jurisdiction, under article III of the Constitution
and under section 1331. Because the case law in this area is
truly a quagmire, it would be folly to suggest that any interpre-
tation has talismanically defined arising under.16 The analysis
will show, however, that section 1331 sometimes extends fed-
eral jurisdiction over at least three genuses of cases: those in
which "positive" federal law-that is, constitutional, statutory,
or international law-explicitly or implicitly creates a cause of
action; those in which the federal judiciary's creation or adop-
tion of law-that is, federal common law or federal court use of
municipal law17 under the "protective jurisdiction" theory1 -
creates a cause of action; and those in which federal law issues
require resolution, even though municipal law creates a cause
of action.
Part III examines how human rights claims interact with
the three genuses of cases. The literature typically has dis-
counted federal question jurisdiction over international law
claims, uncritically assuming that "it is rare that the relation of
a treaty to the plaintiff's claim will be sufficiently direct to sat-
isfy the test of 'arising under.' "19 This Article will argue, how-
16. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8
(1982) ("the statutory phrase 'arising under . . .' has resisted all attempts to
frame a single, precise definition for determining which cases fall within, and
... outside, the original jurisdiction of the district courts"); Cannon v. Loyola
Univ., 609 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (N.D. M. 1985) ("the doctrine interpreting the
meaning of 'arising under' is a quagmire, to say the least"), aff'd, 784 F.2d 777
(1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 880 (1987); Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Re-
quirement that a Case Arise 'Directly" under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
890, 905 (1967) (neither "conceptual standards or self-applying talismanic
phrases" nor "opaque mysticism" of common-sense standards dearly define
federal question jurisdiction).
17. Municipal law refers to nonfederal law, that is, the law of either do-
mestic or foreign states (e.g., California or Paraguay).
18. See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
19. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, 13B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3563, at 64 (2d ed. 1984) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter FEDERAL
PRAcTICE]; see also id. at n.46 (citing cases rejecting § 1331 jurisdiction under
same rationale). To the extent that a particular customary norm bears a rela-
tion to a treaty, see generally infra notes 226-32 and accompanying text, it fol-
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ever, that many human rights claims do involve federal
questions. The seeds of this argument correspond to the three
genuses of section 1331 jurisdiction:
1. International customary and treaty law, as positive federal
law, creates a private cause of action for certain human rights
claims. The term cause of action has two definitions. Some-
times the term focuses upon the violation of a particular legal
right. Under this definition, every individual has the right to
be free from summary execution, torture, slavery, genocide,
and apartheid, based on "self-executing" positive international
law.
If the term cause of action, instead, refers to whether a
particular actor may invoke the federal court's power, positive
international law explicitly creates a cause of action for sum-
mary execution and torture. Positive international law also im-
pliedly grants victims the right to invoke federal court power
over war crimes, genocide, apartheid, hijacking, and certain ter-
rorist acts. This conclusion uses the analysis that courts have
employed to determine whether various criminal statutes con-
tained implied civil causes of action. Under either definition,
when positive international law provides an explicit or implicit
cause of action, section 1331 jurisdiction is available.
2. Even if positive international law, standing alone, does not
create a private cause of action, the common-law and protec-
tive-jurisdiction theories may support section 1331 jurisdiction
over human rights claims. The common-law theory arises from
the idea that federal decisional law should govern human rights
claims. Certain treaties, which create a cause of action, but
which the United States has not adopted, may generate a cus-
tomary-law cause of action cognizable under federal common
law. The interstices of other treaties, which do not create a
cause of action, but which the United States has adopted, also
may give rise to a human rights cause of action.
Alternatively, under the protective-jurisdiction theory, fed-
eral judges may adopt or "federalize" nonfederal causes of ac-
tion for human rights claims. Protective jurisdiction is
legitimate in certain section 1331 cases with strong article I for-
eign policy implications, such as human rights claims. An ac-
tive federal policy condemning terrorism and human rights
lows, under the rationale indicated in Federal Practice, that such custom also
would be insufficiently related to most private claims to satisfy the arising
under test.
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abuses buttresses this conclusion. Choice-of-law principles will
identify the appropriate nonfederal rules of decision.
3. The third genus provides section 1331 jurisdiction when
plaintiff's claim raises a substantial issue of federal law, even
though nonfederal law grants the cause of action. Courts use
this approach liberally in cases with significant foreign policy
implications. Most human rights cases involve federal issues,
such as the availability of jurisdictional immunity, the effect of
the act of state doctrine, and the legitimacy of judicial authority
under international law. Each of these issues significantly af-
fects foreign relations. Because of this impact, section 1331 ju-
risdiction should succeed even if the rule of decision is not
federal, as, for example, when the rule is the tort law of the
situs.
Assuming that federal question jurisdiction exists, courts
should exercise it over most human rights claims. Judicial ab-
stention doctrines, such as the political question doctrine, the
act of state doctrine, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
normally should not bar the use of federal authority in this
context based on separation of powers, comity, or pragmatic
considerations, as demonstrated elsewhere.
20
20. Courts examine both whether they have jurisdiction and, if so,
whether they should exercise that jurisdiction. Having and exercising juris-
diction are distinct from one another. In examining the preliminary jurisdic-
tional issue, the essential inquiry is whether article III permits jurisdiction in
the federal courts. That inquiry, which involves separation of powers and fed-
eralism considerations, is central to Parts II and III of this Article.
When jurisdiction exists, a federal court may consider whether various
doctrines counsel against exercising that jurisdiction. For instance, the polit-
ical question doctrine, concerning nonjusticiable questions touching sensitive
political nerves, and the act of state doctrine, concerning certain sovereign acts
committed within the foreign sovereign's territory that are beyond judicial
purview, may militate against adjudication of a case. Both doctrines derive
from overlapping separation of powers concerns, although the act of state doc-
trine also derives from international comity. Both doctrines, although not ad-
dressed in this Article, should be considered in human rights cases, once
jurisdiction is invoked. See Randall, Civil Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 104-08;
Randall, Further Inquiries, supra note 9, at 509-10, 522-27, 529-30. The perva-
sive condemnation in law, politics, and scholarship of human rights violations
and terrorism should facilitate the exercise of jurisdiction under the political
question and act of state doctrines. Id. Such broad consensus permits judicial
adjudication in sufficiently defined areas of international law, avoids conflicts
with the executive branch and Congress, and satisfies foreign policy considera-
tions. Unless the executive branch expressly requests courts to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction in a given case, the federal judiciary usually acts in con-
cert with its coordinate branches and the nation's international commitments
when it adjudicates human rights claims.
Moreover, the pragmatic and evidentiary concerns of the forum non con-
[Vol. 73:349
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The focus of Part IV shifts from the examination of juris-
diction within the United States to an examination of domestic
jurisdiction within the international legal system. Part IV ar-
gues that by sustaining jurisdiction over extraterritorial human
rights claims, domestic courts act appropriately as the agents of
the world legal order.21 This thesis draws support from the
universality principle, which allows any state to exercise juris-
diction over certain egregious offenses, regardless of specific
links between the forum and the offense.2 Similarly, the jus
cogens and erga omnes doctrines identify certain human rights
norms and prohibitions of terrorism as fundamental to the
world legal order; these doctrines also help signify the legiti-
macy, if not the obligation, of domestic jurisdiction over viola-
tions of those norms and prohibitions. More broadly, however,
Part IV argues that the post-World War II human rights move-
ment signifies a structural revision of the world legal order.23
Although state sovereignty remains the hallmark of the legal
order, it is now meaningful to speak of a human rights para-
digm, by which the conventional statist perspective has yielded
to the creation of individually enforceable rights. Ultimately,
the human rights paradigm obligates domestic courts, including
the federal judiciary, to assume authority over violations of in-
ternational rights.
I. FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
CLAIMS: A STATUTORY OVERVIEW
At the threshold, a human rights litigant must allege an
adequate statutory basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction
veniens doctrine also take on a special dimension in cases involving extraterri-
torial human rights violations and terrorism. If witnesses and evidence are
situated in more convenient proximity to a foreign tribunal, a federal court
may decline to exercise its jurisdiction. See Randall, Further Inquiries, supra
note 9, at 530-31; Randall, Civil Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 108-09. As those
sources indicate, however, courts usually show deference to plaintiff's choice
of forum. Moreover, the forum non conveniens doctrine is predicated on the
availability of an alternative forum to adjudicate adequately and fairly the
case. The frequent occurrence of unredressed human rights violations and ter-
rorism in the foreign situs may indicate that an adequate alternative forum
does not exist. Id Consequently, the forum non conveniens doctrine should
not justify the dismissal of many human rights claims.
21. See infra note 402 and accompanying text.
22. See generally Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 9 (analyzing
universality principle's doctrinal evolution).
23. See infra Part IV(C).
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under title 28 of the United States Code.2 Section 1331 may be
vital to human rights claimants suing both state and nonstate
defendants, given the judiciary's restrictive interpretations of
sections 1330, 1332(a)(2), and 1350 of title 28.2
In actions against states, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 ("FSIA") 26 is particularly relevant. Section 1330
grants district court jurisdiction over claims against states in a
narrow range of cases, designated as exceptions to sovereign
immunity in section 1605 of the FSIA.27 Those exceptions have
supplied little relief to the victims of extraterritorial human
rights violations, primarily because most human rights claims
sound in tort. The FSIA's "tort exception" to sovereign immu-
nity forecloses federal jurisdiction unless the tort in question
occurred within United States territory.28 Hence, neither a tor-
ture victim brutalized by government officials in Argentina nor
the representatives of an Israeli executed by Libyan-backed ter-
rorists in Tel Aviv could use the FSIA's tort exception to sue a
responsible state.29 In addition, the FSIA's "waiver exception"
to sovereign immunity30 may not suffice; only one court has
found an implied waiver of immunity based on the sovereign's
24. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-2906 (1982) (entitled "Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure").
25. Although those provisions have been the most relevant to human
rights claims, they are not the only conceivably relevant bases of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.
26. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(3), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982).
27. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1604, 1605 (1982); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1607
(1982) (limiting immunity of states that bring actions in United States courts
respecting counterclaims). Only states and their political subdivisions, agen-
cies, and instrumentalities are covered by the FSIA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603
(1982).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982) (denying immunity to states when dam-
ages are sought "for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property,
occurring in the United States and caused by tortious action or omission").
Moreover, an entire tort, including defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injuries,
must have occurred in the United States to preclude jurisdictional immunity.
E.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir.
1985) (describing nearly unanimous precedent interpreting § 1605(a)(5) to re-
quire occurrence of entire tort in United States).
29. The examples in the text are from Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argen., No. CV-82-1772 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file), vacated and dismissed (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7,1985) (FSIA grounds), and Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (dis-
missing complaint against Libya on FSIA grounds), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1003
(1985).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982) (denying immunity when state "has
waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication").
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ratification of a humanitarian treaty.3 1 Courts also rarely ac-
cept the argument that sovereign immunity is unavailable per
se whenever human rights offenses and other international law
violations are at issue.32
31. Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246,
254-56 (D.D.C. 1985) (finding that Soviet Union, as party to Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations and Convention on Internationally Protected Persons,
implicitly waived its immunity regarding alleged mistreatment and possible
murder of Swedish diplomat). Von Dardel remains a singular case, despite the
arguments of human rights advocates that every treaty recognizing fundamen-
tal individual rights and remedies constitutes evidence "that a foreign state
signator has impliedly waived any claim to immunity from the exercise of such
a right to an effective remedy." Paust, Draft Brief Concerning Claims to For-
eign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunity for Violations
of International Law under the FSLA, 8 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 49, 66 (1985). For a
broad rejection of the waiver argument, see Frolova, 761 F.2d at 376-78 (stating
that waivers of jurisdictional immunity ordinarily must be explicit and neither
the United Nations Charter nor the Helsinki Accords imply such a waiver cov-
ering the Soviet Union's refusal to allow emigration of plaintiff's spouse to
United States). See also Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329,
331, 333 (9th Cir.) (holding that United States-Iran Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations, and Consular Rights did not waive Iran's sovereign immunity in
connection with revolutionary group's alleged assassination of United States
citizen), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984).
Related to the waiver argument is an argument based on § 1604, which
notes that sovereign immunity is "[slubject to existing international agree-
ments to which the United States is a party." 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982) (empha-
sis added). For instance, the appellant in Frolova argued that under § 1604,
the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Accords governed and precluded the Soviet
Union's claim of immunity from a challenge to its denial of emigration; that is,
the Soviet Union's immunity was subject to, and thus precluded by, those
agreements. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, holding that individ-
uals could not directly enforce those instruments. Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373-76.
See also Comment, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and International
Human Rights Agreements: How they Coexist, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 71 (1982) (ex-
amining both § 1604 and § 1605(a)(1) arguments).
32. Compare Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 253-54 (stating that immunity
under FSIA does not extend to "clear violations of universally recognized
principles of international law," including offenses against diplomat) and Lete-
lier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that dis-
cretionary function exception to tort exception to sovereign immunity,
§ 1605(a)(5)(A), does not apply to assassination of former Chilean Ambassador,
which "is clearly contrary to the precepts of humanity as recognized in both
national and international law") with Berkovitz, 735 F.2d at 331 (rejecting ar-
gument that "unfriendly nature of political assassination," even coupled with
animosity between United States and Iran, provides exception to sovereign im-
munity) and Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 558 F. Supp. 358,
363 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (rejecting argument that, when Soviet Union denies
emigration of plaintiff's spouse, it impliedly waives its jurisdictional immunity
because "the Soviet Union violated international law"), aff'd, 761 F.2d 370,
(7th Cir. 1985). Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d
421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 1466 (1988), also may be relevant to
this point. See infra notes 36-37.
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Moreover, the conventional wisdom has been that the
FSIA exclusively controls the extent to which federal jurisdic-
tion is available over states.33 Under this view, if jurisdiction is
unavailable under one of the FSIA's exceptions, other provi-
sions of title 28 may not be alleged.3 Given the FSIA's narrow
exceptions and its exclusive jurisdictional grant, the statute has
not supported human rights jurisdiction over states in most
cases.35
A recent Second Circuit opinion, however, deviated from
the judicial trend and held that the FSIA is not the exclusive
basis of jurisdiction over states. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.
v. Argentine Republic36 indicated that the FSIA neither re-
pealed nor preempted the availability of other jurisdictional
provisions of title 28 when a sovereign violates international
law.37 Thus, in both the important Second Circuit and in other
33. See, e.g., Hercaire Int'l, Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 559, 563 (11th Cir.
1987); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 372 (7th Cir.
1985); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 586-87 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984); Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 688
F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1982); Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 667 F.2d
1151, 1153 (4th Cir. 1982); Rex v. Compania Pervana de Vapores, 660 F.2d 61,
69 (3d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); Ruggiero v. Compania
Peruana de Vapores, 639 F.2d 872, 875-78 (2d Cir. 1981); Carl Marks & Co. v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 665 F. Supp. 323, 328, 333, 335 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988); Jackson v. People's Republic of China,
596 F. Supp. 386, 387 (N.D. Ala. 1984), qff'd, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1371 (1987); Tigchon v. Island of Jamaica, 591 F. Supp.
765, 766 (W.D. Mich. 1984); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461
U.S. 480, 489, 491 n.16 (1983) (dictum) ("Congress clearly intended [FSIA] to
govern all actions against foreign sovereigns").
34. See McKeel, 722 F.2d at 586-87 (stating that Congress's policy favoring
"uniformity in decision" implies that courts may exercise jurisdiction over for-
eign states only under FSIA).
35. Randall, Civil Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 91-93; see Recent Develop-
ment, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 221, 230-31 (1987).
36. 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (2-1 decision), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466
(1988).
37. Amerada Hess involved a suit by the owner and time charterer of a
Liberian oil tanker against Argentina, concerning the defendant's armed and
unprovoked attack on the tanker in international waters during the Falklands
War. Having determined that Argentina had violated international law, id. at
423-24, the Second Circuit upheld jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, despite
the absence of jurisdiction under the FSIA, id. at 426-28, and in the face of the
Supreme Court's contrary dictum in Verlinden, id. at 426; see also supra note
33 (citing Verlinden's dictum). The court expressly limited its holding to cases
involving international law violations. Id at 428-29. Although § 1350 provided
the jurisdictional alternative to the FSIA in Amerada Hess, the case's holding
apparently permits jurisdiction over actions involving sovereign defendants
under other provisions, such as §§ 1331 and 1332(a)(2). See infra notes 43-51
and accompanying text for a discussion of § 1350. The Second Circuit sug-
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circuits that may follow Amerada Hess, the victims of state-
sponsored human rights violations and terrorism may allege
subject matter jurisdiction under statutory provisions alterna-
tive to, and more hospitable than, the FSIA. Section 1331 is one
such alternative that may be used in human rights cases against
states.
In cases brought against nonstate defendants,3 8 section
1331's importance increases, because courts have narrowly con-
strued other jurisdictional provisions, such as sections
1332(a)(2) and 1350. Section 1332(a)(2) creates jurisdiction over
all civil actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds
$10,000 and arises between "citizens of a [domestic] State and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state."3 9 That provision, cor-
rectly called alienage jurisdiction,4 0 creates federal jurisdiction
over extraterritorial tort claims involving damages of more
than $10,000, without regard to whether international human
rights law was violated.41 Alienage jurisdiction, however, will
not permit one alien to sue another alien in federal court.F
Alienage jurisdiction does extend to suits between United
States citizens and aliens in human rights cases. Because most
gested that its holding followed Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985). Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 429 n.2. In
Von Dardel, a case involving the defendant's alleged extraterritorial offenses
against a diplomat, the district court sustained jurisdiction under the FSIA as
well as under §§ 1331 and 1350.
Even if the Supreme Court reverses Amerada Hess or other courts choose
not to follow it, the FSIA would be the exclusive jurisdictional vehicle only in
actions involving state defendants. Jurisdiction over human rights claims
against nonstate defendants still may be available under other statutory provi-
sions, such as § 1331. Comment, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine
Republic: An Alien Tort Statute Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 72
MINN. L. REV. 829 (1988), contains a valuable examination of the case.
38. Such defendants can include individuals, government officials, terror-
ist groups, or hijackers.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1982). Diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(1)
is relevant to human rights claims involving United States citizens from differ-
ent domestic states as parties. Congress recently increased the amount in con-
troversy required for diversity jurisdiction to $50,000. See Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201(a), 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 4642, 4646 (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a), (b)).
40. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23 n.1 (4th ed. 1983).
41. See id at § 23 n.9.
42. See Hodgson & Thompson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304
(1809); Dassigienis v. Cosmos Carriers & Trading Corp., 442 F.2d 1016, 1017 (2d
Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345, 1349
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). An alien cannot sue another alien under § 1332(a)(2) even
when citizens are added as parties to the action. E.g., Lavan Petroleum Co. v.
Underwriters at Lloyds, 334 F. Supp. 1069, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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human rights litigation, however, typically postures alien
against alien, section 1332(a)(2) has been of little utility to
human rights plaintiffs. Consequently, the importance of sec-
tion 1331, which contains no alienage or other party restriction,
increases in human rights cases.
The Alien Tort Statute, section 1350,4 3 also has been lim-
ited by certain courts in the human rights context. Originally a
provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789,44 section 1350 creates dis-
trict court jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."45 Based on this language, victims
of extraterritorial torts involving human rights violations under
the law of nations or a treaty may bring claims against nonstate
and state actors alike.46 Although the Alien Tort Statute has
been invoked rarely during its 200-year history, the Second Cir-
cuit revived it in 1980, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.47 In that case,
Dr. Joel Filartiga, a prominent critic of the Stroessner regime,
brought an action against a former Paraguayan police official
who had fatally tortured Filartiga's son in Paraguay. Jurisdic-
tion was sustained under section 1350 and, on remand, the
plaintiff was awarded a judgment of more than $10 million.48
Although Filartiga introduced a new human rights era in civil
litigation, courts subsequently have sustained jurisdiction only
sporadically under section 1350.49 The circuits remain both di-
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
44. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). For accounts of
the statute's origins, see Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction
over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CoNN. L. REv.
467, 488-98 (1986); Randall, Alien Tort Statute, supra note 9, at 11-31.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
46. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussion of Amerada
Hess, in which § 1350 allowed jurisdiction although FSIA did not). Section
1350 actions against states are possible only if Amerada Hess is followed.
47. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
48. 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ($10,385,364 judgment). Com-
mentaries on Filartiga include Bilder, Integrating International Human
Rights Law into Domestic Law-U.S. Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981);
Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARv.
INT'L L. J. 53 (1981); Hassan, Panacea or Mirage? Domestic Enforcement of
International Human Rights Law: Recent Cases, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 13 (1981);
Paust, Litigating Human Rights: A Commentary on the Comments, 4 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 81 (1981); Rusk, A Comment on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 311 (1981); Sohn, Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations, 11
GA. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 307 (1981).
49. Filartiga engendered a significant increase in reliance on section 1350.
Randall, Alien Tort Statute, supra note 9, at 4-7 & nn.15, 17. Athough parties
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vided and confused over section 1350's proper contours,50 and
some proposed legislation and recent studies advocate amend-
ing or replacing the provision.51
Amid such clatter and confusion, section 1331 offers an al-
ternative basis for federal jurisdiction over human rights
claims. In rejecting section 1350 jurisdiction, some federal
judges have viewed the Alien Tort Statute as obscure, arcane,5 2
or limited to cases involving eighteenth century international
law violations.53 Those judges may be more inclined to sustain
jurisdiction under the more familiar federal question provision.
Section 1331, which is surely not limited to eighteenth century
offenses, is also advantageous because it allows both citizens
and aliens to commence human rights cases.
Other courts have rejected section 1350 jurisdiction, how-
ever, under the rationale that international law does not itself
explicitly provide a federal cause of action to human rights
subsequently have alleged § 1350 in various contexts, id, at 7 n.17, Filartiga
represents the archetypal case of the modern genre of human rights claims.
As this author's prior research indicates, however, in approximately the first
six years following Filartiga's decision, courts sustained jurisdiction under
§ 1350 in only two of 16 cases reported on LEXIS. I&i at 7 n.19. For a discus-
sion of more recent sources that indicate sporadic success of § 1350 over
human rights claims, see Recent Development, Foreign Sovereign Immunity,
supra note 35, at 223 n.9; Recent Developments, supra note 5, at 433 n.1.
50. The disagreement over § 1350's application is punctuated by the sepa-
rate concurrences authored by panel members in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Re-
public, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert denied, 740 U.S. 1003
(1985), dismissing a case involving extraterritorial terrorist acts in Israel.
Judges Edwards, Bork, and Robb each wrote a lengthy concurring opinion ex-
plaining why he was correct, and his colleagues were wrong, about why § 1350
did not create jurisdiction in the case. As Judge Bork concluded: "the three
opinions we have produced can only add to the confusion surrounding [the
Alien Tort Statute] .... Though we agree on nothing else, I am sure my col-
leagues join me in finding that regrettable." Ii at 823 (Bork, J., concurring).
51. Randall, Civil Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 111-12; Randall, Further
Inquiries, supra note 9, at 511-12. Such legislative efforts and suggestions have
not yet come to fruition.
52. See, eg., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 827 (Robb, J., concurring) ('e ought
not to parlay a two hundred years-old statute into an entree into so sensitive
an area of foreign policy" as extraterritorial terrorism. 'Ve have no reliable
evidence whatsoever as to what purpose this 'legal Lohengrin' . . . was in-
tended to serve." (citing IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir.
1975))); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.) (re-
jecting jurisdiction under Alien Tort Statute, "a dnd of Legal Lohengrin:
although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act... no one seems to
know whence it came").
53. Such violations include piracy and offenses against ambassadors. See,
e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812-16 (Bork, J., concurring).
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claimants.5 4 When courts have employed that same rationale to
examine federal question jurisdiction over human rights claims,
section 1331 has not offered a useful alternative to section
1350.s5 An approach that focuses solely on the presence of an
explicit cause of action fails, however, as Parts II and III will
show, because such an approach misconstrues both the concept
of a cause of action and the concept's application in the human
rights context. Although this Article's analysis of human rights
causes of action also may support section 1350 jurisdiction over
such claims, this Article focuses on section 1331 as a useful and
important jurisdictional alternative in human rights cases
brought against state and nonstate defendants.
II. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
A. OSBOR", VERLINDEN, AND CONFUSION: AN INTRODUCTION
Article III of the Constitution provides the starting point
for any analysis of federal jurisdiction. Section 2, clause 1 of ar-
ticle III provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority."' ' The ratio decidendi of fed-
eral jurisdiction over cases arising under those sources, the
"Supreme Law of the Land,"57 is clear. In the words of Alex-
ander Hamilton, as "Publius," it "seems scarcely to admit of
controversy that the judiciary authority of the Union ought to
extend.., to all those cases which arise out of the laws of the
54. Even more preliminarily, there is disagreement concerning whether
§ 1350 requires a cause of action to arise under international law. For analysis
of that debated issue, see Randall, Further Inquiries, supra note 9, at 477-95.
Examples of opinions indicating that § 1350 requires an international law
cause of action, and finding jurisdiction unavailable in the absence of such a
cause of action, include Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 816-19 (Bork, J. concurring);
Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976);
Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).
55. E.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 800-22 (Bork, J., concurring) (jurisdiction re-
jected under §§ 1331 and 1350 due to absence of cause of action under interna-
tional law). Some federal judges view § 1331, but not § 1350, as requiring a
cause of action under international law. See Tel-Oren at 779 (Edwards, J., con-
curring). Before those judges, therefore, § 1331 alone poses the "cause of ac-
tion" hurdle to human rights claimants.
56. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III explicitly refers to cases aris-
ing under treaties, and encompasses, by implication, cases arising under cus-
tomary international law. Henkin, supra note 14, at 1559-60. This conclusion
depends upon customary law's inclusion as federal law under the supremacy
clause. See supra note 14.
57. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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United States."5 8 "If there are such things as political axioms,"
he continued, "the propriety of the judicial power of a govern-
ment being coextensive with its legislative may be ranked
among the number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the in-
terpretation of the national law decides the question. '5 9
The arising under provision of the Constitution encom-
passes both original and appellate jurisdiction.60 This Article
focuses on original jurisdiction. With one limited exception,
however, Congress did not give federal courts general original
jurisdiction over all actions arising under federal law until
1875.61 Before 1875, the arising under provision was relevant
only when Congress had granted jurisdiction within more nar-
row contexts; the courts had to determine whether the arising
under or another constitutional provision authorized jurisdic-
tion in those limited contexts.
Within such a context, Chief Justice Marshall enunciated
the first important interpretation of original federal question
jurisdiction in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.62 In Os-
born, Ohio had imposed a tax on a congressionally chartered
federal bank.6 3 The bank sued to enjoin the state auditor from
collecting the tax, claiming that the tax was unconstitutional.6 4
Notably, the bank's charter granted the bank "the right 'to sue
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 475 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
59. Id. at 476.
60. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over arising under
cases; Congress also may give appellate and original jurisdiction to lower fed-
eral courts. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; art. HI, § 1.
61. Regarding the 1875 codification, see infra notes 76-80 and accompany-
ing text. Regarding the one pre-1875 grant of general original federal question
jurisdiction, see Holt, The First Federal Question Case, 3 LAw & HIST. REV.
169, 170 (1985) ("only one case was ever brought under [the Judiciary Act of
1801] in which its limits and meaning might have been tested,... but that case
helps to demonstrate the vast possibilities inherent in the constitutional con-
cept of 'federal questions' "). But cf. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal
Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article
III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 850-51 (1984) ("the federalist supporters of the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789 may well have believed that they had granted to the fed-
eral courts the whole of the judicial power of the United States, at least the
whole of that power as it was understood during the ratification process").
62. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). For Justice Marshall's earlier considera-
tion of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over arising under cases, see
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 379 (1821) ("A case in law or equity
consists of the right of the one party, as well as of the other, and may truly be
said to arise under the constitution or a law of the United States, whenever its
correct decision depends on the construction of either.").
63. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 739-40.
64. See id at 757.
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and be sued,' 'in every circuit court of the United States.' "65
Justice Marshall viewed that language as a grant of federal ju-
risdiction 66 and held that article III supported such jurisdic-
tion.67 Justice Marshall's result in Osborn was obvious.
Because the bank challenged the constitutionality of a state tax
law, the claim clearly arose under federal law.
Justice Marshall, however, going beyond the immediate
facts in Osborn, explained that the Constitution also supported
federal jurisdiction in any case involving the bank.68 The
bank's right to sue and to be sued arose from its charter. Con-
sequently, federal law would answer any future questions con-
cerning the bank's right to sue. Because a defendant could
raise such questions at the beginning of every lawsuit,69 Justice
Marshall did not believe that a single case could resolve a chal-
lenge to the bank's right to sue. Justice Marshall held that
"[t]he question [concerning the bank's right to sue] ... forms an
original ingredient in every cause. Whether it be in fact relied
on or not, in the defence, it is still a part of the cause, and may
be relied on."70 Hence, the constitutionality of jurisdiction de-
pends "on the character of the cause,"71 which, in turn, depends
on whether a federal question theoretically may arise as an in-
gredient in a case.72
The breadth of Osborn's original ingredient test was neces-
sary to sustain jurisdiction in a companion case, Bank of the
65. Id at 817.
66. See id.
67. See id at 817-28.
68. See id. at 821-25.
69. Id. at 824. If the bank were the defendant in a case, it might question
its ability to be sued under its charter.
70. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 822 ("If it be a sufficient founda-
tion for jurisdiction, that the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated
by one construction of the constitution or law of the United States, and sus-
tained by the opposite construction .... then all the other questions must be
decided as incidental to this, which gives that jurisdiction.").
71. Id. at 822.
72. For criticism of Justice Marshall's approach, one need look no further
than Justice Johnson's dissent in the case. Justice Johnson argued that "the
principle of a possible occurrence of a [federal] question, as a ground of juris-
diction, [transcends] the bounds of the constitution, [which may cause] an
enormous accession, if not an unlimited assumption, of jurisdiction." Id at 889
(Johnson, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). According to Justice Johnson,
the Constitution does not support jurisdiction "until a [federal] question actu-
ally [arises], until such a case [is] actually presented." Id at 885. But cf Note,
The Outer Limits of "Arising Under", 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 978, 986-88 (1979) (ar-
guing that Osborn did not recognize jurisdiction over hypothetical federal
questions, but required "a federal proposition in formulating the complaint").
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United States v. Planters' Bank.73 In that case, the national
bank sued on a promissory note, seeking relief under Georgia
state law.74 Justice Marshall summarily determined that sub-
ject matter jurisdiction was constitutional in Planters' Bank,
reasoning that the jurisdictional "question was fully considered
by the court in the case of [Osborn], and it is unnecessary to re-
peat the reasoning used in that case."75 The upshot of Planters'
Bank is that a simple contract* case brought by the national
bank, involving Georgia law as the rule of decision, arises under
federal law because the case might theoretically involve a fed-
eral question. Because the defendant might challenge the
bank's ability to sue and to enter into a contract, a case conceiv-
ably could raise questions concerning its charter. Federal law
thus might be an ingredient in the recipe of the case.
Osborn's significance grew with the passage of the 1875 Ju-
diciary Act.76 Section 1 of that Act created original jurisdiction
over "all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity ...
arising under the Constitution or the laws of the United States,
or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their author-
ity."77 That provision tracks the arising under language of arti-
cle III of the Constitution. According to the available
legislative history, the provision's drafters intended it to grant
federal court jurisdiction over all cases contemplated by article
III's arising under component.78 The 1875 Judiciary Act im-
73. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824). In Osborn, 'viarshall was construing for
the future, and characteristically he construed broadly in order to allow future
change and growth." Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal
Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 649 (1942). Osborn's future began with Plant-
ers' Bank.
74. Planters'Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 904-05.
75. Id at 905. Justice Johnson dissented, id. at 910, as he had in Osborn,
see supra note 72.
76. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)) [hereinafter 1875 Judiciary Act].
77. Id. § 1 (emphasis added). Although this provision, like its current
counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, embodies the general federal question jurisdic-
tion of district courts, Congress also has continued to grant jurisdiction over
specific categories of cases involving federal questions. FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 19, at §§ 3568-3585, surveys the more limited jurisdictional grants
drawing constitutional support from article I.
78. Prior legislation "did not confer the whole [judicial] power which the
Constitution conferred." But "[t]his bill does. This bill gives precisely the
power which the Constitution confers-nothing more, nothing less." 2 CONG.
REC. S4986 (1874) (statement of Sen. Carpenter). These comments by the
bill's drafter concern the Judiciary Act of 1875 in its entirety and they appar-
ently constitute the full evidence of Congress's intent concerning the bill's
arising under component. See also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation
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posed a federal question amount in controversy requirement,79
and directed dismissal or remand if a suit did "not really and
substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within
[the court's] jurisdiction."80 Congress, however, has erased both
qualifications.8 '
Since 1875, courts have bemoaned the purported complex-
ity of using statutory federal question jurisdiction.8 2 As re-
cently as 1982, the Supreme Court referred to Osborn as a
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.8 (1983) (suggesting that Congress may have meant to
confer complete constitutional power to § 1331, but that article III jurisdiction
has long been judicially recognized to be broader); Forrester, Federal Question
Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 TUL. L. REV. 263, 276-78 (1943) ("the drafts-
man's intent could not be more clearly or emphatically expressed"); Fraser,
Some Problems in Federal Question Jurisdiction, 49 MICH. L. REv. 73, 74-75
(1950) (Judiciary Act parallels meaning in Constitution).
79. 1875 Judiciary Act, supra note 76, at § 1 (requiring more than $500 in
controversy).
80. ci at § 5.
81. The amount in controversy requirement was partially removed in
1976, Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (removing monetary
requirement in actions brought against United States, its agencies, and em-
ployees acting in official capacity), and entirely removed in 1980, see Act of
Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369. In 1948, Congress effectively
omitted the language directing dismissal or remand of cases which did "not re-
ally and substantially" befit federal jurisdiction. See P. BATOR, P. MsHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 836-37 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
Hence, arguments that the amount in controversy and really and substantially
requirements narrowed statutory federal question jurisdiction from its consti-
tutional counterpart and Osborn, see Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 73, at
649-50, naturally lose force when those requirements disappear.
82. See supra note 16 and authorities cited therein. Diverse remedial sug-
gestions from commentators reflect the myriad judicial problems involving
federal question jurisdiction. See Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 73, at 664-74
(suggesting that judiciary should focus more restrictively on whether dispute
over federal question is real and substantial); see generally Cohen, supra note
16, at 905-15 (suggesting that federal question jurisdiction should arise only in
cases governed "directly" by federal law); Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial
Power and the 'Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A Hierar-
chical Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563, 566 (1981) (suggesting that arising under ju-
risdiction should depend upon whether case's federal element is sufficiently
anterior to other elements in dispute); Mishlin, The Federal "Question" in the
Distrct Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 184-96 (1953) (suggesting that federal
question jurisdiction should exist over all cases where well-articulated federal
policy is at stake, subject to certain pragmatic limitations); Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 216, 223-34 (1948) (suggesting that federal jurisdiction should extend
beyond Osborn to all cases that Congress could regulate, including those areas
where Congress has been dormant); Note, supra note 72, at 979 (suggesting
that federal question jurisdiction should extend to any case in which plaintiff's
complaint discloses actual and substantial reliance on legal proposition touch-
ing federal primary relationships).
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"controlling decision on the scope of article III 'arising under'
jurisdiction. '8 3 A modicum of logic therefore might indicate
that courts have jurisdiction under section 1331 in any case pos-
sibly involving an original ingredient of federal law. If only
section 1331 were that simple. Instead, as Chief Justice Burger
indicated in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria:8 4
"Although the language of § 1331 parallels that of the 'Arising
Under' Clause of Art. III, this Court never has held that statu-
tory 'arising under' jurisdiction is identical to Art. III 'arising
under' jurisdiction. 85 In short, despite the dictates of legisla-
tive history and literalism, "Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction
is broader than federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. '"86
Consequently, Osborn controls only those cases in which
article III's arising under clause supports a statutory basis of
original jurisdiction other than section 1331. In Verlinden, for
example, a Dutch corporation sued the Central Bank of Nige-
ria, alleging an anticipatory breach of a letter of credit estab-
lished for Nigeria's contractual obligation to purchase cement;
Dutch law governed the dispute.8 7 The complaint alleged sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA.8 8 The Supreme Court
held that even if a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign sovereign in
federal district court on a nonfederal cause of action, jurisdic-
tion comports with article III's arising under clause.8 9
Although Verlinden itself was a cement contract case, Justice
Burger generally suggested that all "[a]ctions against foreign
sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues concerning the
foreign relations of the United States, and the primacy of fed-
eral concerns is evident." 90 Echoing Osborn's original ingredi-
ent test, Justice Burger concluded: "At the threshold of every
action ... against a foreign state, . . . the [district] court must
83. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983).
84. Id
85. Id at 494.
86. Id. at 495.
87. Id at 482.
88. Id at 482-83. See also supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing FSIA). The plaintiff alleged that the waiver exception, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(1), and the commercial activity exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), to
sovereign immunity applied. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 488 F.
Supp. 1284, 1293-1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd 647 F.2d 320, rev'd, 461 U.S. 480
(1983).
89. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 491-97. Article III's alienage provision did
not support jurisdiction in this case involving only foreign parties. See supra
text accompanying notes 39-42.
90. Id. at 493. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-25 (1964).
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satisfy itself that one of the [FSIA's] exceptions applies ....
Accordingly, an action against a foreign sovereign arises under
federal law, for purposes of Art. III jurisdiction."9 '
Conversely, cases in which original jurisdiction stems from
section 1331 require something more than an original or thresh-
old ingredient of federal law. The Supreme Court has inter-
preted section 1331's arising under language more restrictively
than the statute's constitutional counterpart, due to the "de-
mands of reason and coherence, and the dictates of sound judi-
cial policy which have emerged from [the statute's] function as
a provision in the mosaic of federal judiciary legislation. It is a
statute, not a Constitution, we are expounding."92 Hence, in
section 1331 cases, the judiciary purportedly must limit Os-
born's analytical parameters.
Although one is a statutory provision and the other a con-
stitutional provision, the distinction between section 1331 and
article III is no more than a judicial myth.93 This argument
reaches beyond section 1331's language and legislative history.9
In actuality, a court does not face an inherently different task
when jurisdiction is alleged under section 1331, the FSIA, or a
clause in a bank's charter. The jurisdictional statute in each
case is just that, a jurisdictional statute, deriving its support
from the same constitutional provision. Accordingly, a court al-
ways should consider whether a particular case arises under
federal law. Every case requires resolution of the same issue:
do the allegations present an issue of federal interest, as encom-
passed by constitutional, international, or other federal law?
That issue does not necessitate applying a different arising
under analysis contingent upon the jurisdictional statute al-
leged by plaintiff. The doctrinal conceptualization of arising
under need not differ. Instead, regardless of the jurisdictional
statute, courts should employ a single, functional analysis (Os-
born's or another) to determine whether the facts, laws, and
circumstances of any given case cause it to arise under the Con-
91. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493-94 (emphasis added).
92. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379
(1958) (footnote omitted).
93. For a critical and useful analysis of the relationship between the aris-
ing under components of § 1331 and article III, see Note, supra note 72, at 988-
95 (criticizing as mythical the difference between the statutory and constitu-
tional language and concluding that the only defensible limitation on Osborn is
the judicial requirement that § 1331 cases indicate a substantial reliance on a
federal proposition).
94. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 73:349
HUMAN RIGHTS
stitution, laws, or international law of the United States.95
Nevertheless, because the dichotomy drawn by the
Supreme Court between section 1331 and article III seems here
to stay, this Article will not argue directly against that dichot-
omy any further.96 The analysis instead will try to navigate the
muddy waters of the section 1331 case law. This requires more
than a reliable compass or guide, because, by the Supreme
Court's own admission, "the statutory phrase 'arising under...'
has resisted all attempts to frame a single, precise definition for
determining which cases fall within, and which cases fall
outside, the original jurisdiction of the district courts." 97
B. THREE GENUSES OF FEDERAL QUESTION CASES
Risking the dangers of oversimplification involved in draw-
ing any legal categories, this Article will show that courts have
recognized section 1331 jurisdiction in at least three genuses of
95. Mishkin strenuously argues that the statutory arising under provision
deserves a different analysis than that applied to the constitutional arising
under provision, because the former grants original lower court jurisdiction,
while the latter encompasses both original and appellate jurisdiction. See
Mishkin, supra note 82, at 163-76. According to Mishkin, the Constitution's
arising under clause must be interpreted broadly enough to comprehend ap-
pellate cases that, during litigation, present a crucial federal issue. In such
cases, the Supreme Court must have the final say under its appellate jurisdic-
tion. I&L at 163. But because "it may often be difficult to determine the pres-
ence and materiality of a federal question until some point long after the
litigation has started," the inclusion within original lower court jurisdiction of
"all cases which might conceivably turn finally upon an issue of national law
would create an impossible situation." I&
Mishkin's argument reduces to the following Because courts apply aris-
ing under jurisdiction in different contexts, each application requires a differ-
ent interpretation. The distinction Mishkin draws between the original and
appellate applications of arising under jurisdiction falters, however, because it
fails to acknowledge that courts may use a single doctrinal approach to analyze
arising under jurisdiction in different contexts. In short, "[1]t is not the mean-
ing of 'arising under' that varies but the posture of the case." See Note, suprz
note 72, at 989-90.
96. For indirect suggestions that the dichotomy is fallable, see infra notes
182-88 and accompanying text (suggesting that protective jurisdiction theory
equally supports cases relying on § 1331 jurisdiction and cases based on other
statutory applications of arising under jurisdiction). See also infra notes 189-
202 and accompanying text (noting that third genus of § 1331 case law is con-
ceptually similar to Osborn).
97. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).
The compass metaphor derives from Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109,
118 (1936) (Cardozo, J.) (stating that in statutory federal question cases, courts
have distinguished basic and collateral federal controversies and would "be
lost in a maze if we put that compass by"). Cohen, however, considered
Gully's analytical compass broken. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 903-05.
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cases. Whether warranted or not, one rule remains constant in
each genus: the well-pleaded complaint rule, which, despite Os-
born, holds that the existence of a federal question must be de-
termined only from the plaintiff's complaint, bill, or
declaration.98 By formulating and analyzing the three genuses,
this subsection will provide a doctrinal framework in which to
organize the otherwise amorphous case law. Part III then will
use that framework to assess section 1331 jurisdiction specifi-
cally over human rights claims.
Though sometimes overlapping and sometimes contradic-
tory, the three genuses generally move from narrow to broad
interpretations of arising under jurisdiction. Indeed, the final
interpretations actually complete a full circle back to Osborn's
approach. More specifically, this subsection's organizing princi-
ple is the relationship between a cause of action and positive
federal law. Between the first and third genuses, the rights and
remedies available to plaintiffs become increasingly attenuated
from positive federal law, until there is no pretense that plain-
tiff's cause of action arises under federal law.99
98. See, e.g., Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. at 9-10 (noting that despite
diverse interpretations of arising under jurisdiction, "[o]ne powerful doctrine
has emerged ... the 'well-pleaded complaint' rule"); Gully, 299 U.S. at 113
(stating that federal question "must be disclosed upon the face of the com-
plaint, unaided by the answer"); Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)
(stating that whether cases arise under constitutional or other federal law
"must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's state-
ment of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged
in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may
interpose"). For a recent, insightful critique of the rule, see Doernberg,
There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Com-
plaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 597, 599 (1987) (directing attention to fact that even if case turns on
important question of federal law, federal question jurisdiction does not exist
unless federal question appears in plaintiff's "well-pleaded complaint"). This
fixation on the complaint ignores Osborn, which premised jurisdiction on the
possibility that a defendant might challenge the national bank's right to sue.
See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
The well-pleaded complaint rule applies to both the original and removal
jurisdiction of district courts. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (removal jurisdiction). Moreover, though
this Article focuses on the district courts' original jurisdiction, its analysis also
applies to removal jurisdiction, because "any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdic-
tion, may be removed by the defendant" to federal district court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) (1982). Particularly, any civil action in which the district courts have
original federal question jurisdiction "shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties." IHi § 1441(b).
99. Although this part of the Article aims to craft an original framework
of federal question cases, it stems, at least in part, from Merrell Dow, 478 U.S.
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1. First Genus: Cases Involving Express or Implied Causes of
Action under Positive Federal Law
a. American Well Works
Under the first genus, section 1331 creates original jurisdic-
tion over cases in which positive "federal law creates the cause
of action." 10° The term positive federal law refers to constitu-
tional law, federal statutory law, and international law. Posi-
tive law contrasts with the judicially formulated sources
considered under the second genus. 01 ' The first genus derives
from Justice Holmes's 1916 opinion in American Well Works
Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,102 one of the earliest decisions effec-
tively limiting the arising under statute, thus distancing the
statute from both its constitutional counterpart and from Os-
born.0 3 Although critics have assailed Justice Holmes's opin-
ion and offered alternative jurisdictional approaches,10 4
Holmes's opinion remains valid and may have particular impor-
tance to human rights claims.'0 5
In American Well Works, the plaintiff manufactured and
at 807-10 (indicating existence of first and third genuses); Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. at 27-28 (same); Republic of Phil. v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352-
54 (2d Cir. 1986) (referring to all three categories discussed herein); Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 647 F.2d 320, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1981) (referring to
the three genuses of § 1331 jurisdiction discussed herein), rev'd, 461 U.S. 480
(1983); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825-28 (2d Cir. 1964) (referring
to the three categories discussed herein), cert denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
100. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808.
101. Rather than representing a jurisprudential term of art, positive fed-
eral law here encompasses the legal sources that the legislative and executive
branches of the United States have enunciated or recognized. Ordinarily ex-
pressed in writing, these legal sources of positive law also include certain legal
practices, such as international custom. Although both of the first two genuses
identify causes of action under federal law, the second requires greater judicial
creation and cognition of the cause of action. Causes of action under the sec-
ond genus thus arise less directly under the positive federal law.
102. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
103. See id at 260 ("A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action.").
104. See, eg., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 91,
(1982) (claiming that "even the most ardent proponent of the Holmes test has
admitted that it has been rejected as an exclusionary principle"). For other
criticism of, and alternatives to, Justice Holmes's approach, see sources cited in
note 82, supra.
105. Not only does Justice Holmes's oft-criticized approach still provide the
analytical starting point in many § 1331 cases, but courts also have rejected
§ 1331 jurisdiction in several recent human rights cases under the specific ra-
tionale that international law does not explicitly create plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion, see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text, infra notes 244-67 and
accompanying text, a rationale premised on Justice Holmes's approach.
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sought to patent a certain pump.10 6 The plaintiff alleged dam-
age to its title and business due to the defendant's libelous and
slanderous statements, which accused the plaintiff of patent in-
fringement and threatened to sue the plaintiff's customers. 0 7
Although patent law is federal,10 8 Justice Holmes found that
the lower court lacked federal question jurisdiction because "[a]
suit for damages to business caused by a threat to sue under the
patent law is not itself a suit under the patent law."' 0 9
An element of libel and slander is the falsity of defendant's
statements,110 which here necessarily would have involved an
examination of defendant's patents under federal law. Justice
Holmes nevertheless ruled that the defendant's alleged "wrong
is its manifest tendency to injure the plaintiff's business,""'
which is somehow "equally actionable whether it produces the
result by persuasion, by threats, or by falsehood. ... ."11 Hence,
plaintiff's allegation "depends upon the law of the State where
the act is done, not upon the patent law, and therefore the suit
arises under the law of the State."' " Finally, in the most fa-
mous passage in this genus of the case law, Justice Holmes con-
cluded: "A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action."" 4 Although the Court has separated the concepts of
"jurisdiction" and "cause of action" in other instances," 5 Jus-
tice Holmes indicated here that the availability of federal juris-
diction depends on the existence of a federal cause of action." 6
Although courts regularly repeat Justice Holmes's famous
passage, his use of the term cause of action has proved prob-
lematic.117 The meaning of cause of action is ambiguous be-
cause, as the Supreme Court has noted, a " 'cause of action' may
mean one thing for one purpose and something different for an-
other."" 8 Thus, the first genus employs one elusive term,
106. American Well Works, 241 U.S. at 258.
107. Id.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
109. American Well Works, 241 U.S. at 259.
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). But see id. § 581A
(truth constitutes an affirmative defense in defamation actions, although first
amendment case law may be eroding practical effect of this rule).
111. American Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260.
112. I& at 259.
113. Id. at 260.
114. Id
115. See infra note 123.
116. See supra note 113 and accompanying text and text accompanying
note 114.
117. See supra text accompanying note 114.
118. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1933)
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cause of action, to define another, arising under. An examina-
tion of the Supreme Court's opinion in Davis v. PassmanI"9
will clarify the term cause of action.
b. Davis v. Passman
Petitioner Shirley Davis, a deputy administrative assistant
to United States Representative Otto Passman, lost her job
when Passman concluded that a man should fill her position. °20
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held that section
1331 provided original district court jurisdiction over the
case.- 2' He ruled that Davis had "a cause of action under [the
equal protection component of] the Fifth Amendment, and...
her injury may be redressed by a damages remedy." 22 In
reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan examined two impor-
tant definitions of cause of action, which, by extrapolation, help
define Justice Holmes's approach to the first genus.123
Justice Brennan's first definition focuses on the plaintiff's
legal rights: a cause of action "refers roughly to the alleged in-
(Cardozo, J.); see also United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947)
("[o]ne of the most theory-ridden of legal concepts is a 'cause of action' ").
119. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). For a beneficial examination of the meaning of a
cause of action, focusing on certain bankruptcy claims, see Gibson, Removal of
Claims Related to Bankruptcy Cases: What is a "Claim or Cause of Action"?,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1986).
120. Davis, 442 U.S. at 230.
121. Id. at 236 (sustaining jurisdiction under then-existing statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (1976)).
122. Id. at 248-49.
123. Although this Article uses Davis to define cause of action, the case's
greater precedential significance is its extention of the holding of Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Bivens held that the fourth amendment may imply a private cause of action
and that money damages are an appropriate remedy when injuries result be-
cause federal agents conduct unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 386-88.
Davis extended Bivens to apply to alleged fifth amendment violations. Davis,
442 U.S. at 238-39.
Davis's approach to § 1331 jurisdiction, in a sense, conflicts with the Amer-
ican Well Works approach. In Davis, Justice Brennan initially concluded that
"[ilt is clear that the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
to consider petitioner's claim." 442 U.S. at 236. He next considered whether
petitioner had an implied cause of action. Id. at 236-45. This approach draws
support from Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) ("Whether the complaint
states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law
and.., it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed [federal
question] jurisdiction over the controversy."). By determining the availability
of § 1331 jurisdiction before deciding whether a cause of action exists, Davis
and Bell contradict American Well Works, which makes § 1331 jurisdiction
contingent on plaintiff's ability to allege a federal cause of action.
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vasion of 'recognized legal rights' upon which a litigant bases
his claim for relief."' 2 4 To fit the first genus, positive federal
law must recognize the right.1-5 At the jurisdictional level, the
first definition of cause of action requires only a positive fed-
eral right. 26 Apparently, federal law need not create an ex-
plicit remedy for the invasion of the plaintiff's right.
Justice Brennan's second definition refers to the "question
of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of liti-
gants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the
power of the court.' 7 Justice Brennan's opinion here distin-
guishes between constitutional law claims and claims involving
other federal laws. 2 8 Federal law may explicitly or implicitly
authorize a private party to invoke the power of the court.
Cases involving implied private causes of action naturally re-
quire greater examination.
The Supreme Court has considered whether courts should
infer a private cause of action from various federal statutes that
are primarily criminal or regulatory in nature. 2 9 Because the
"ultimate question is one of congressional intent,"'3 0 courts
must consult each statute's language and legislative history to
determine whether Congress intended a private cause of action.
In Cort v. Ash13 ' the Supreme Court enunciated four criteria
124. Davis, 442 U.S. at 238.
125. Right here apparently refers simply to a benefit or the entitlement to
be free from a certain injury.
126. Davis, 442 U.S. at 238-39.
127. Id at 240 n.18.
128. Id at 241-42.
129. See, e.g., Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 534-42 (1984) (Q 36(b)
of Investment Company Act of 1940 does not imply a right of action for invest-
ment company or its shareholders); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-
98 (1981) (Q 10 of Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 does not imply
private cause of action); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
14-19 (1979) (§ 215, but not § 206, of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 im-
plies private cause of action); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
568-78 (1979) ( 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not imply pri-
vate cause of action); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689, 709
(1979) (§ 901(a) of title IX of Education Amendments of 1972 implies private
cause of action); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80-84 (1975) (18 U.S.C. § 610, criminal
statute prohibiting certain corporate election contributions, does not imply pri-
vate cause of action); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454,
459-61 (1975) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 implies private remedy in private employment
discrimination); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) ( 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 implies private
cause of action); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (§ 14(a) of Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 implies cause of action).
130. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578.
131. 422 U.S. at 66.
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that a court should use to clarify congressional intent:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,"... that is, does the statute create afederal right
in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? ... And
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law,
in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inap-
propriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 132
Cort's first criterion concerns the implication of a federal
right; its second and third criteria concern whether federal law
implies a remedy. Assuming an understanding of the term
right,a Davis suggests that remedy means simply congressio-
nally sanctioned private enforcement of implied statutory
rights in federal court.' M In other words, after satisfying Cort's
first criterion by proving that positive law implies a private
right, the plaintiff must satisfy Cort's second and third criteria
by showing Congress's intent to permit that right to be en-
forced through a civil suit. The fourth Cort criterion considers
whether federal or state law appropriately generates a cause of
action, under Davis's second definition.
Courts apply Davis's second definition of cause of action
differently when the Constitution, in contrast to other federal
laws, provides the positive federal law in a case. Although the
Bill of Rights provisions do not explicitly permit individuals to
invoke judicial power, the Cort criteria should not determine
whether constitutional provisions imply a cause of action. In-
stead, "[a]t least in the absence of 'a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political
department' . . . we presume that justiciable constitutional
132. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added) (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (deleting emphasis from original)). The quest to
determine congressional intent subsumes the Cart criteria. For criticism of
those criteria, see Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting).
133. See supra note 125. It is acknowledged, however, that the term right
may refer to several legal and philosophical meanings. See generally Henkin,
International Human Rights as "Rights," 1 CARDozo L. REv. 425 (1979) (dis-
cussing several concepts of rights with emphasis on human rights).
134. Cort's remedy criteria do not require that federal law implies that any
particular form of relief is appropriate. The issue of whether the plaintiff has
an implied remedy and a private cause of action "is analytically distinct and
prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to re-
ceive." Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979). Hence, remedy refers only
to the propriety of invoking the judicial power to enforce the plaintiff's im-
plied rights. If the plaintiff invokes jurisdiction this way, issues related to the
case's merits and plaintiff's relief remain.
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rights are to be enforced through the courts."'1 35 Particularly
litigants who "have no effective means other than the judiciary
to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke the existing ju-
risdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable
constitutional rights.' 136
2. Second Genus: Cases Involving Causes of Action that
Federal Judges Create or Adopt
The second genus of the federal question case law is but a
variation of the first. Again, a federal cause of action is neces-
sary: plaintiff must show the invasion of a federally recognized
right and the authorization to enforce that right in federal
court. Under the second genus, however, the federal cause of
action springs less directly from positive law and more from the
substantive law that the federal judiciary creates or adopts.
This subsection first considers the judiciary's creation of federal
common-law causes of action and then reviews the judiciary's
adoption of nonfederal causes of action under the protective ju-
risdiction theory.
a. Federal Common Law
The term federal common law refers "generally to federal
rules of decision where the authority for a federal rule is not
explicitly or clearly found in federal statutory or constitutional
command."'137 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 138 declared that
"there is no federal general common law."'1 39 In Hinderlider v.
La Plata River Co.,140 decided the same day as Erie, the
Supreme Court unanimously maintained that federal common
law would regulate water apportionment in the specific context
of domestic interstate streams.141 Hence, a general federal
common law was out, particularly in diversity cases. A more
specialized federal common law, however, was still in-that is,
a federal common law in nondiversity cases that involve federal
interests which are insufficiently regulated by positive federal
135. Davis, 442 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
136. 1&L Otherwise, "such rights are to become merely precatory." I&
137. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 81, at 770.
138. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
139. I& at 78 (emphasis added).
140. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
141. 1.& at 110 (stating that "whether the water of an interstate stream
must be apportioned between the two states is a question of 'federal common
law.' ").
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law.14 As indicated by a prominent commentator, "Erie led to
the emergence of a federal decisional law in areas of national
concern."
143
The term laws contained in both article II1144 and section
1331145 includes a reference to the federal common law.14 A
plurality of the Supreme Court in Romero v. International Ter-
minal Operating Co.147 suggested that section 1331 jurisdiction
applies to cases arising under the federal common law.148 The
Court unanimously affirmed this position in Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee.149 Illinois sued four Wisconsin cities and two city
and county sewage commissions for allegedly polluting Lake
Michigan.L50 The Court, through Justice Douglas, held that its
original jurisdiction over controversies between domestic states
was not exclusive in the case because only one state, Illinois,
was a party, and because it was not mandatory that the plaintiff
join Wisconsin as a defendant. In short, the cities and sewage
commissions, Wisconsin's political subdivisions, were not
"states" within the Court's grant of original jurisdiction. 151 In
addition, the Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction
because section 1331 provided original district court jurisdiction
in the case.152
For the notion that section 1331 includes claims founded on
federal common law, Justice Douglas relied on Romero's plu-
rality opinion: "'federal courts have an extensive responsibility
142. Some exceptions may exist to the usual rule disallowing federal com-
mon law in diversity cases and allowing federal common law in nondiversity
cases. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 81, at 766 (noting that Erie prohibits
federal common law, for any state law governs on its own, regardless of basis
for jurisdiction); 13B FEDRAL PRACTICE, supra note 19, § 3563, at 60-61 ("Fed-
eral law, when it exists, controls in federal court even in diversity cases .... ).
143. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964) (emphasis added).
144. U.S. CONST. art. IlI.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982).
146. That conclusion is necessarily the starting point of analysis in the
cases discussed infra in notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
147. 358 U.S. 354 (1958).
148. Id. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
149. 406 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1972).
150. Id. at 93.
151. Id. at 93-98 (holding that original jurisdiction was not mandatory
under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1964), which provides that "'the Supreme Court
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) All controversies between
two or more States.' ").
152. Id. at 98-101 (holding that because original jurisdiction of Supreme
Court is not exclusive, these suits may be brought in or removed to district
courts).
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of fashioning rules of substantive law .... These rules are as
fully 'laws' of the United States as if ... enacted by Con-
gress.' "153 Justice Douglas held that the Illinois cause of action
arose under the federal common law: "When we deal with air
and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a fed-
eral common law .... ,1-' Largely because Congress had tried
to abate the pollution of interstate waters, Justice Douglas con-
cluded that the case demanded a specialized federal rule of
decision.15 5
The creation of federal common-law causes of action in Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee and other cases draws support from a
few authorities. When it helps to implement a principle of con-
stitutional or other federal law, common law draws force from
such positive substantive law. In such cases, the line between
the first and second genuses of the case law blurs, as Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee illustrates.1 56 The distinction between the
first genus-in which the judiciary may infer a cause of action
from positive law-and the second genus-in which the judici-
ary may create one with support from the positive law-de-
pends subtly on the breadth of the interstices of the positive
law at issue and the amount of judicial creativity required. As
perfectly put by leading commentators: "Statutory [or constitu-
tional] interpretation shades into judicial lawmaking on a spec-
trum, as specific evidence of legislative advertence to the issue
at hand attenuates. '157
Alternatively, with less reference to positive law, the fed-
eral judiciary simply may create common law in areas "that are
federalized by force of the Constitution itself."158 Professor
Hill persuasively reasons that there exist specific "areas in
which Congress is enabled to act [but which] are foreclosed to
state action by the terms of the Constitution itself."'159 The fed-
eral courts may formulate common law in such an area, when
positive law does not resolve the case at hand. According to
Hill, this "constitutional preemption" permits federal courts to
153. Id. at 99 (citations omitted) (quoting Romero v. International Termi-
nal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393 (1958)).
154. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 103.
155. Id at 101-05.
156. See supra text accompanying note 155. Justice Douglas's decision
drew support from regulatory environmental legislation.
157. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 81, at 770.
158. Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1031 (1967).
159. Id. (Congress, for example, may coin money and declare war, but
states may not).
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make law particularly in disputes involving one or more states
of the Union, admiralty controversies, cases involving the fed-
eral government and its instrumentalities, and cases involving
international law or foreign relations. 6 0
b. Protective Jurisdiction
The protective jurisdiction theory provides another version
of the second genus. According to Professor Wechsler, federal
jurisdiction should extend "to all cases in which Congress has
authority to make the rule to govern disposition of the contro-
versy but is content instead to let the states provide the rule so
long as jurisdiction to enforce it has been vested in a federal
court."''1 Instead of enacting substantive legislation based on
its authority under article I, section 8 of the Constitution, Con-
gress may allow federal courts to borrow nonfederal rules of
decision from the fifty states or foreign nations. In such in-
stances, "[a] case is one 'arising under' federal law within the
sense of article III whenever it is comprehended in a valid
grant of jurisdiction as well as when its disposition must be gov-
erned by the national law."' 62 Thus, articles I and III unite to
support the judicial use of nonfederal causes of action in areas
of national concern.163 Federal courts regulate federal interests
in this way.
Professor Mishkin offers a narrower view of protective ju-
risdiction, arguing that it should extend only "where there is an
articulated and active federal policy regulating a field."' 64
Within Mishkin's limited scope, however, "the 'arising under'
clause of Article III apparently permits the conferring of juris-
160. Id. at 1030-79. Professor Hill distinguishes international law from for-
eign relations.
161. Wechsler, supra note 82, at 224 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 225.
163. For a discussion of the amalgam of article I and article I support, see
Mishkin, supra note 82, at 188-93; Wechsler, supra note 82, at 224-25; Note, The
Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 933, 947-59 (1982). The
article I support includes the necessary and proper clause, art. I, § 8, cl. 18, by
which Congress implicitly may delegate its authority to the judiciary through
jurisdictional grants. Article III supports protective jurisdiction because fed-
eral jurisdictional statutes are laws of the United States and cases involving
those statutes thus arise under federal law for article III purposes. See
Mishkin, supra note 82, at 188-93; Wechsler, supra note 82, at 225. Arguably,
through the adoption and use of nonfederal rules of decisions, federal judges
may "federalize" those rules; that is, transform nonfederal law to federal.
Thus, the causes of action that those rules supply arise under federal law for
article III purposes.
164. Mishkin, supra note 82, at 192.
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diction on the national courts over all cases in the area-includ-
ing those governed by state [nonfederal] law. '165 Wechsler's
and Mishkin's theories contain vestiges of Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinions in Osborn and Planters' Bank. Based on the
existence of a jurisdictional statute and the hypothetical issues
stemming from that statute, Justice Marshall upheld federal
question jurisdiction, even though Georgia law provided the
rule of decision, at least in Planters' Bank.1'
Despite some continuing and resourceful scholarly support
for the protective jurisdiction theory,167 the judiciary has not
fully embraced protective jurisdiction. Although the Supreme
Court has not expressly ruled on its validity,168 Justice Burton
accepted the doctrine in his concurring opinion in Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.169 Conversely, Justice Frank-
furter's dissent in that case strongly rejected the doctrine. 70
Lincoln Mills measured the constitutionality of section 301(a)
of the Taft-Hartley Act,171 which gave federal district courts
original jurisdiction over cases alleging violations of labor-man-
agement contracts. 172 Because section 301(a) did not refer to
the citizenship of the parties to those cases, it was not sup-
ported by article III's diversity clause.173 Moreover, because
section 301(a) did not create any rules of decision, the Textile
Workers Union argued that labor contract cases arose under
nonfederal law. Jurisdiction over those cases thus arguably was
unsupported by article III's arising under clause.'1 4 The Court
upheld Taft-Hartley's jurisdictional grant, however, and con-
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction, The
Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdic-
tion in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343, 367-82 (1985) (dis-
cussing jurisdiction in practice and theory); Casto, supra note 44, at 512-25
(same); Galligan, Article III and the "Related to" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A
Case Study in Protective Jurisdiction, 11 U. PuGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 43-47
(1987) (stating that protective jurisdiction is most persuasive justification for
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction); Note, supra note 163, at 996-1003, 1024-25
(discussing protective jurisdiction).
168. For a succinct discussion of Supreme Court opinions impliedly sup-
porting some form of protective jurisdiction, see Brown, supra note 167, at 370-
75.
169. 353 U.S. 448, 459-60 (1957) (Burton, J., concurring).
170. I& at 460 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
171. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1982).
172. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449-51.
173. See id.
174. I& at 449.
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cluded "that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a)
is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of
our national labor laws."'175 Accordingly, in section 301(a)
cases, causes of action arise under federal common law; federal
jurisdiction in such cases is thus constitutional.
After initially criticizing the Court's federal common-law
ruling,176 Justice Frankfurter's dissent rejected the protective
jurisdiction theory used in Justice Burton's brief concurrence
and carefully avoided in the majority's federal common-law rul-
ing.'7 7 Although the Constitution probably requires adoption of
nonfederal law in most diversity and alienage cases because ju-
risdiction stems from the nature of the parties, Justice Frank-
furter found adoption of nonfederal law in arising under cases
to be unjustified under article III: "'Protective jurisdiction'
cannot generate an independent source for adjudication outside
of the Article III sanctions and what Congress has defined."'178
Actually, Justice Frankfurter's similar criticisms of both the
federal common-law and protective jurisdiction theories' 79 indi-
cates that it is not always easy to separate the two theories. In-
deed, judicial reference to, or reliance on, nonfederal law in the
creation of federal common-law causes of action 180 differs little
from the adoption of nonfederal causes of action under protec-
tive jurisdiction. Perhaps, then, the legitimacy of jurisdiction
over federal common-law cases also supports judicial authority
under the protective jurisdiction theory.
175. 1& at 456.
176. According to Justice Frankfurter, the majority gave "this plainly pro-
cedural section," § 301(a), an "occult content" that "transmuted [it] into a man-
date to the federal courts to fashion a whole body of substantive federal law
appropriate for the complicated and touchy problems raised by collective bar-
gaining." Id at 461 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
177. Disagreeing with the majority that federal common law is the applica-
ble substantive law in § 301(a) cases, Justice Burton nevertheless concluded
that "some federal rights may necessarily be involved in a § 301 case, and
hence... the constitutionality of § 301 can be upheld as a congressional grant
to Federal District Courts of what has been called 'protective jurisdiction."'
Id. at 460 (Burton, J., concurring).
178. Id at 475 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
179. Both criticisms involve the charge that article III is violated. Compare
id at 465 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court's common-law rul-
ing avoided addressing constitutional problems that its interpretation of § 301
actually raises) with i& at 477-78 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that be-
cause § 301(a) is "wholly jurisdictional," it "bristles with constitutional
problems under Article III" that protective jurisdiction theory does not
resolve).
180. See Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428,
1450-51 (1960).
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Notwithstanding the limited judicial acceptance of the pro-
tective jurisdiction theory, this Article supports its application
to human rights claims. Taking the position opposite that of
Justice Frankfurter and assuming the constitutionality of pro-
tective jurisdiction,181 this Article's thesis requires two addi-
tional and interlocking building blocks: that protective
jurisdiction is legitimate in section 1331 cases involving signifi-
cant federal interests; and accordingly, that protective jurisdic-
tion is particularly appropriate when section 1331 is invoked
over human rights claims. The first of these points is discussed
in this subsection; the second point is discussed in Part III.
The thesis posits initially that protective jurisdiction is as
legitimate in cases involving the general federal question stat-
ute, section 1331, as it is in cases involving more specific federal
question statutes, such as section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley
Act. As discussed earlier, under the Supreme Court's current
dichotomy, section 1331 cases receive a more narrow arising
under interpretation than cases involving other arising under
grants of district court jurisdiction.18 2 If that dichotomy also is
used to limit protective jurisdiction over section 1331 cases, this
subsection's initial premise may be fragile. That is, even if pro-
tective jurisdiction supports section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley
Act, it may not support section 1331 jurisdiction. It may be con-
tended that Congress delegated less judicial authority to adopt
nonfederal law under section 1331 than under the more specific
grants of federal question jurisdiction; otherwise, the protective
jurisdiction theory would extend section 1331 to every garden-
variety tort and contract case involving nonfederal causes of
action.183
This subsection maintains, however, that its thesis's start-
ing point is sound. Protective jurisdiction should extend to sec-
tion 1331 cases as it does to cases involving other jurisdictional
181. In other words, this Article assumes that the protective jurisdiction
theory is generally sound constitutionally, as the works of Mishkin and Wechs-
ler and the sources cited at note 167, supa, fully explain. Readers rejecting
this assumption may wish to skip directly to the third genus. Remaining read-
ers will witness the extension of Mishkin's and Wechsler's theories within the
specific context of this Article.
182. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
183. C f Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 474 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (rejecting protective jurisdiction generally because it
would vastly extend federal jurisdiction, so that "every contract or tort arising
out of a contract affecting commerce might be a potential cause of action in
the federal courts, even though only state law was involved in the decision of
the case").
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grants, at least in areas that involve particularly strong federal
interests. Recall that protective jurisdiction relies not only on
the judiciary's authority under article III, but also on Con-
gress's authority under article I.184 Even if federal courts
choose to limit their article III authority in most section 1331
cases, their authority to adjudicate certain section 1331 cases is
supplemented by Congress's article I powers. The additional
article I support may even mandate that the judiciary assume
its full authority over cases entailing important federal con-
cerns. Cases with important foreign relations implications,
such as human rights claims, surely involve serious federal in-
terests. The delegation of certain foreign affairs powers to Con-
gress is one of the most significant aspects of article .:15
Indeed, the foreign affairs delegation fostered a broader consti-
tutional goal: consolidation of colonial foreign affairs authority
within a strong centralized government, so that the power
could "be more perfectly and punctually" managed.186
Courts should interpret section 1331 cases involving article
I interests of this magnitude broadly under the protective juris-
diction theory, not narrowly under the statutory, nonconstitu-
tional view of arising under jurisdiction. This conclusion is
particularly warranted in the human rights area, in which fed-
eral interests have been articulated through an active congres-
sional policy.18 7 Under this limited application of the protective
jurisdiction theory, section 1331 does not broaden federal juris-
diction excessively. Instead, the articulated federal interests
render section 1331 more comparable to the specific grants of
federal question jurisdiction, ensuring that section 1331 will not
govern mundane tort and contract cases. 18
184. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
185. See generally Randall, Alien Tort Statute, supra note 9, at 11-15
(describing constitutional deposit of foreign affairs authority in federal govern-
ment). For a related argument that Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig.,
461 U.S. 480 (1983), see supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text, presents a
legitimate jurisdictional basis under protective jurisdiction, see Note, supra
note 163, at 1003-14. Finding that Osborn supported jurisdiction in Verlinden,
the Supreme Court did not rule on the protective jurisdiction theory in the
case. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 491 n.17.
186. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (J. Jay) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
187. The "articulated and active" standard derives from notes 164-65 and
accompanying text, supra. This standard is applied to protective jurisdiction
over human rights claims in Part HI(B)(2)(b), infra notes 343-52 and accompa-
nying text.
188. For a different view supporting protective jurisdiction over certain
§ 1331 cases when nonfederal causes of action borrow or incorporate federal
law, see Note, supra note 163, at 988-96.
1988]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
3. Third Genus: Cases Involving a Substantial Issue of
Federal Law
Within the third genus of the case law, there is no preten-
sion that plaintiff's cause of action arises under federal law.
This genus, as the Supreme Court indicated in Franchise Tax
Board v. Laborers Vacation Trust,'8 9 allows section 1331 juris-
diction "where the vindication of a right under [domestic] state
law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law."'9
Although nonfederal law provides the rule of decision, section
1331 jurisdiction serves to facilitate the resolution of "a sub-
stantial question of federal law."'191 As with the other genuses,
the jurisdiction-triggering criterion-here, the need to resolve a
substantial federal issue-must stem from a well-pleaded
complaint.192
The third genus actually derives from Osborn and its com-
panion, even though the Supreme Court has disavowed Os-
born's application to section 1331 cases.193 The third genus
differs from Osborn only in that it requires an actual and sub-
stantial federal issue; in contrast, Osborn justified jurisdiction
based on a hypothetical federal issue. Having formally ban-
ished Osborn to a corner of the case law, however, the Court
prefers to rest the third genus upon Smith v. Kansas City Title
& Trust Co.194
In Smith, a shareholder sued the corporation to enjoin its
purchase of bonds issued under the federal Farm Loan Act.195
The plaintiff's cause of action arose under Missouri law, which
prohibited the state-chartered corporation from investing in
189. 463 U.s. 1 (1982).
190. ML at 9. Laborers Vacation Trust involved a dispute over whether ER-
ISA permitted California to collect unpaid state income taxes by levying on
funds held under a vacation benefit plan that ERISA covered. The defendants
asserted that ERISA preempted California's levy power and removed the
cause from state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The Supreme Court held that
the case was not within the federal district court's removal jurisdiction. "[Flor
reasons involving perhaps more history than logic," the Court ruled that be-
cause the defense raised the preemption issue and the issue received no men-
tion in the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint, the district court did not have
federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. Laborer's Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
at 4. For a discussion of this case, see Note, Federal Jurisdiction over Preemp-
tion Claims: A Post-Franchise Tax Board Analysis, 62 TEX. L. REV. 893 (1984).
191. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. at 28.
192. See id. at 9-12; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing well-pleaded complaint rule).
193. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
194. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
195. Id at 195.
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bonds that were unconstitutionally issued.1' Despite the state-
created cause of action, the Court upheld federal question juris-
diction under section 1331's statutory predecessor because of
the constitutional question concerning the bonds' issuance. L9 7
When it appears from the plaintiff's complaint, wrote the
Smith Court, "that the right to relief depends upon the con-
struction or application of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and that such federal claim is not merely colora-
ble, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court
has jurisdiction under [the statute]."'198
Obvious similarities mark Smith's approach and that of the
purportedly inapposite Osborn.199 Moreover, Smith is virtually
impossible to reconcile with American Well Works and the
first genus, which requires a federal cause of action, not simply
a federal issue of law or fact.2° ° Indeed, Justice Holmes, the au-
thor of American Wells Works, dissented in Smith.20 1 So here
the species of section 1331 case law seem to contradict more
than to converge. Nevertheless, this Article will divorce Smith
and its modern counterpart, Laborers Vacation Trust, from the
section 1331 quagmire and take them at face value. Therefore,
Laborers Vacation Trust's standard, "that some substantial,
disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one
of the well-pleaded state claims, '20 2 must be applied to cases in
the final section 1331 genus.
196. Id at 214 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
197. Id at 199-202.
198. Id at 199.
199. Osborn, Planters' Bank, Smith, Laborers Vacation Trust, and Verlin-
den all agree that arising under jurisdiction may extend to cases involving fed-
eral questions, even absent a federal cause of action. See supra notes 62-91,
189-92 and accompanying text. Only Smith and Laborers Vacation Trust in-
volved the general federal question jurisdiction statute in its original or re-
moval form; the other cases involved more specific federal question
jurisdictional grants. Because all five cases generally agree about the breadth
of arising under, however, they together cast doubt on the Supreme Court's
conclusion that § 1331's arising under language is narrower than the article HI
arising under language employed in the cases not invoking § 1331. See supra
notes 93-95 and accompanying text, infra notes 359-61 and accompanying text.
200. See supra Part HI(B)(1).
201. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 213 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
202. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1982).
The Court confirmed the correctness of that standard in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986).
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III. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION OVER
HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS
While the three genuses of the section 1331 case law some-
times converge and sometimes diverge, it is useful to work
within this structural triptych. This Part examines how human
rights claims interact with the three genuses of the federal
question case law.
International human rights law usually is viewed as a an
outgrowth of World War 11203 and the Axis nations' violent ag-
gression and brutalization of human beings. After the Axis's
surrender, certain individuals were prosecuted as war
criminals.20 4 At the major trials, such as the one conducted by
the International Military Tribunal ("IMT") at Nuremberg, the
defendants were prosecuted for three principal offenses:
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against human-
ity.20 5 Those trials helped to define the legal regime outlawing
aggressive acts and human rights violations by firmly establish-
ing that individuals, as well as states, may bear liability for in-
ternational law violations.2°6 Recognition of criminal liability
for crimes against humanity was particularly significant be-
cause it diminished absolute sovereign authority over the treat-
ment of a state's own nationals.207 The war crimes trials,
moreover, coincided with the birth of the United Nations
("U.N."). Entering into force in 1945, the U.N. Charter aimed
to end "the scourge of war ... to reaffirm faith in fundamental
203. See generally L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMrT, INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 981-93 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAw]
(describing evolution of human rights concerns, which reached "full-blown in-
ternationalization" in the wake of World War II, and identifying key post-War
legal developments).
204. Such prosecutions occurred in various tribunals. See Randall, Univer-
sal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 801-02.
205. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6,
59 Stat. 1546, 1547, E.A.S. No. 472, at 4, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288; see also Control
Council Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, art. II, 3 CONTROL COUNCIL, OFFICIAL GA-
ZETTE OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 49,51 (Jan. 31, 1946), reprinted
in 1 THE LAW OF WAIR A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 908 (L. Friedman ed. 1972)
(Control Council Law No. 10 governs trials administered by one of Allies in
occupied zones); see generally Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at
801-02 (discussing offenses prosecuted at war crimes trials and comparing
them to other international crimes).
206. As succinctly put by the IMT: "Crimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities [ie., states], and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced." International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and
Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 221 (1947) (hereinafter IMT Judgment).
207. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, pt. VII introductory note.
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human rights,... and to establish... justice and respect for
the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of inter-
national law .... ,,208 Paralleling the legal norms underlying
the war crimes trials, the U.N.'s ideals prohibited both the use
of force and human rights violations committed by either states
or individual actors.209
During the past forty years, various multinational treaties
concerning human rights violations and terrorism have imple-
mented the normative principles of the IMT and the U.N. This
Part first will briefly describe those treaties, along with rele-
vant customary international law and other legal sources.210
This Part later will provide a fuller analysis, examining human
rights claims under the section 1331 genuses.
208. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
209. Indeed, a 1946 General Assembly resolution affirmed the international
law principles contained in the IMT Charter and Judgment, thus explicitly
recognizing individual responsibility for the offenses prosecuted at Nurem-
berg. G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/64/946 1, at 188 (1946). Also pursuant to those
principles, the General Assembly established a committee (eventually the In-
ternational Law Commission ("ILC")) to codify the "offenses against the peace
and security of mankind." G.A. Res. 177, U.N. Doc. A164/947 at 110 (1947).
G.A. Res. 174, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/64/947, at 105 (1947) established the ILC; its
first draft cede, concerning individual responsibility, appears in U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/25 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 278, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1950/Add. 1. The U.N. has not yet adopted the code. The
ILC also has addressed state criminal responsibility. See Report of the Com-
mission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Twenty-Eighth Session, 31
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 226, U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976), reprinted in
[1976] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 95, 95, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add. 1
(pt. 2). Under the ILC's standards, international criminal law prohibits both
state and nonstate actors from committing certain terrorist and human rights
offenses.
210. International custom-that is, practices which states accept as legally
binding-and "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are
the primary nontreaty sources of international law, while judicial decisions
and legal scholarship are subsidiary sources. Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1),59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 933 [here-
inafter ICJ Statute]. The Restatement, supra note 8, § 102(1), identifies inter-
national agreements and customary law as primary legal sources and "general
principles common to the major legal systems of the world" as a supplemen-
tary source. Substantial evidence of international rules also derives from judg-
ments and opinions of international and domestic judicial tribunals,
scholarship, and "resolutions of universal international organizations that state
the rule as international law, if adopted by consensus or virtual unanimity."
Restatement, supra note 8, § 103(2). In addition, treaties and customary law
sometimes interact in various ways to create international rules. See infra
notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
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A. THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND TERRORISM
1. Human Rights Law: Summary Execution, Torture,
Slavery, War Crimes, Genocide, and Apartheid
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("Covenant"),2 1 1 which entered into force in 1976, is particu-
larly relevant to human rights claims. The Covenant, which is
part of the so-called "international bill of rights," elaborates on,
and makes legally binding, the human rights provisions of the
U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.2 State parties to the Covenant have an obligation to
create and protect certain fundamental liberties, including the
right to live, to be free from summary execution, to be free
from torture, cruel, or inhuman treatment or punishment, to be
free from slavery or servitude, and to be treated equally before
the law.2 1 3 Article 2(2) requires state parties to adopt domestic
legislation "to give effect to the rights recognized in the ...
Covenant."2 14 Article 2(3), in part, obliges state parties:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms ... are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the vio-
lation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have
his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or
legislative authorities .... and to develop the possibilities of judicial
remedy;215
211. Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at
52, 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Covenant]. The United States is
not a party.
212. See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 208; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (I), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) [here-
inafter Universal Declaration]. Several U.N. Charter provisions concern
human rights and fundamental freedoms, which the Universal Declaration
further defined. Henkin, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS
1, 5-10 (L. Henkin ed. 1981) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS].
Most lawyers view neither the Charter nor even the Universal Declaration as
having created sufficiently specific and direct legal obligations on state parties.
Id. The Covenant transformed the aspirations of those documents into law, id
at 8-11, as did the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 Annex, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). This Article does not discuss the latter
Covenant because it grants judicially enforceable individual rights less di-
rectly. See generally INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS at 8-11 (discussing evolu-
tion of, and comparing, the two Covenants).
213. Those rights appear in the Covenant, supra note 211, in articles 6(1),
6(2), 7, 8(1), 8(2), and 26, respectively.
214. Covenant, supra note 211, art. 2(2).
215. I& art. 2(3) (emphasis added). The Optional Protocol to the Interna-
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Other particularly relevant human rights treaties are the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949,216 providing for the protec-
tion of military and civilian victims of armed conflict; the Geno-
cide Convention,2 17 prohibiting the destruction of a national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group; the Apartheid Convention,21 8
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), established a
Human Rights Committee; a state party to the Covenant may recognize that
Committee's competence to consider human rights complaints from individu-
als subject to that state party's jurisdiction.
216. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [herein-
after Geneva Convention IV]. This Article will refer to the four Geneva Con-
ventions collectively as the Geneva Conventions or the Geneva Conventions of
1949.
Each of the Geneva Conventions protects a particular category of people
during armed conflict between state parties and during occupation of a state
party. The Geneva Conventions do not actually use the term war crimes, but
categorize violations of the conventions' norms as either grave or nongrave
breaches. Grave breaches include "willful killing, torture or inhumane treat-
ment" or "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health." See Geneva Convention I, supra, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, T.I.A.S. No.
3362 at 34, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62; Geneva Convention II, supra, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. at
3250, T.I.A.S. No. 3363 at 34, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Geneva Convention I, supra,
art. 130, 6 U.S.T. at 3420, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 at 106, 75 U.N.T.S. at 238; Geneva
Convention IV, supra, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 at 104, 75
U.N.T.S. at 388; see generally Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at
817-18 (discussing certain penal provisions regarding grave breaches and not-
ing different treatment of grave and nongrave breaches). The Protocol Relat-
ing to Victims of International Armed Conflicts has expanded the category of
grave breaches. Art. 85, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1427 (1977), reprinted in 72 AM. J.
INT'L L. 457 (1978).
217. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. Apply-
ing during peace or war, and deriving from the crimes against humanity
prosecuted at World War II's conclusion, genocidal acts include:
(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical de-
struction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to pre-
vent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.
Genocide Convention, supra, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
218. Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of Apartheid, Nov.
30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter Apartheid Convention], adopted by
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prohibiting the racial segregation and discrimination practiced
in South Africa; and, finally, the Torture Convention.219
Although the Torture Convention and the Covenant explicitly
acknowledge that human rights violations merit civil redress, 2 20
the other treaties explicitly recognize only the defendant's
criminal responsibility. Each of the treaties, however, may im-
pose legal obligations on both state and nonstate actors vis-a-vis
individual victims. 221
G.A. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doe. A/RES/3068 (1973),
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974). The United States is not a party.
219. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Conven-
tion]. This reprint of the Torture Convention is the draft form; minor revi-
sions are indicated in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985). The United States is not yet a
party. See infra note 223.
Perhaps originating from World War II crimes against humanity, torture
is
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as ob-
taining from him or a third person information or a confession, pun-
ishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Torture Convention, supra, art. 1, 23 I.L.M. at 1027.
220. I& art. 13, 23 I.L.M. at 1030 (establishing victim's right to have case
"promptly and impartially examined"); id. art. 14, 23 I.L.M. at 1030 (establish-
ing that victim and dependents have "enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation" in state party's legal system).
221. This point concerns which defendants (that is, states, individuals, or
other nonstate actors) plaintiffs may sue in a § 1331 human rights case. The
treaties explicitly recognize the responsibility of individuals and other non-
state actors not to violate the instruments' substantive norms. Part 1II(B), in-
fra, analyzes how the civil remedy provisions of the Covenant and Torture
Convention and the criminal remedy provisions of the Geneva, Genocide, and
Apartheid Conventions as well as the terrorism and hijacking treaties support
a private cause of action and § 1331 jurisdiction when individuals and other
nonstate defendants violate the treaty norms. When such a cause of action ex-
ists, plaintiffs may sue individuals and other nonstate defendants under § 1331.
Assuming that plaintiffs may allege § 1331 jurisdiction, and not just juris-
diction under the FSIA, in cases against states, see supra notes 33-37 and ac-
companying text, the question arises whether the treaties at hand recognize
that a state owes a legal duty to individuals for human rights violations.
Although the treaties explicitly recognize the civil and criminal responsibility
of individuals and other nonstate actors, the most explicit responsibility of a
state party itself is, vis-4-vis other state parties, to implement and enforce the
treaties' norms against individuals and others within its jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, if a state party did not enforce a treaty's penal or civil provisions
against one of its nationals who committed war crimes or other human rights
[-V'ol. 73:349
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The United States is a party to the Geneva Conventions
and to the Genocide Convention.22 2 It is not a party, however,
to the Covenant or the Apartheid and Torture Conventions,
although President Reagan has submitted the Torture Conven-
tion to the Senate for advice and consent.22 3 If the norms en-
compassed by the latter instruments are to raise federal
questions, they must enter United States law through alterna-
tive sources of international law. Customary law supports such
norms. According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law ("Restatement"), customary human rights law pro-
hibits states from practicing or condoning the following:
genocide; slavery or slave trade; murder; torture, cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbi-
trary detention; systematic racial discrimination; and causing
the disappearance of individuals.224 The United States is sub-
ject to these customary norms, based partly on its support for
violations, any other state party could pursue remedies against the violating
state party. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 703(1).
On several grounds, however, the treaties also may create obligations of
state parties directly to individuals. First, at least the Covenant expressly ac-
knowledges that neither state nor nonstate actors may violate its substantive
norms. See Covenant, supra note 211, art. 5(1), at 53 (nothing in Covenant
may imply "for any State, group or person" the right to derogate from free-
doms recognized therein). The rights that the Covenant encompasses overlap
with rights that the other instruments cover. See supra notes 213 & 216-19 and
accompanying text. If the rights violation occurs as a matter of state policy,
victims can seek redress, by inference, against the state itself. In addition,
precedents recognize state liability to individual human rights victims under
treaty law. See, e.g., infra notes 284-85 and accompanying text. Finally, inter-
national criminal law and customary law buttress state responsibility under
the treaties. See supra note 209 (international criminal law) and infra notes
224-32 and accompanying text (customary law). Those developments help es-
tablish that states bear direct accountability to individual victims for practicing
or condoning human rights violations. By implication, in such instances, the
individual victims themselves may seek redress against the offending state.
This same analysis applies equally to state-sponsored or state-condoned terror-
ism, in light of the treaties discussed in notes 234-40, infra, and accompanying
text. Consequently, when a private cause of action for human rights or terror-
ist offenses supports § 1331 jurisdiction, see infra Part Im(B), international law
permits plaintiffs to sue state and nonstate actors alike.
222. Authorities cited in note 216, supra, indicate that the United States is
a party to the Geneva Conventions. The Senate gave its advice and consent to
the Genocide Convention on February 19, 1986 and President Reagan signed
legislation on November 4, 1988, allowing the nation finally to ratify that
treaty. See Roberts, President Signs Bill Ratifying U.N. Accord Against Geno-
cide, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1988, § A, at 3, col. 1.
223. Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention Against Torture
and Other Inhuman Treatment or Punishment, 24 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
642 (May 20, 1988).
224. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 702. Section 702 also prohibits con-
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.225
Those customary norms, moreover, overlap with the norms
encompassed by the three treaties to which the United States is
not a party. In the lexicon of the North Sea Continental Shef
Cases,226 treaties may codify, crystallize, and even create cus-
tomary law; that law may bind nonparties that do not persist-
ently object to it.2 27  The Covenant and the Torture
Convention, to some extent, have codified or crystallized the
post-war condemnation of crimes against humanity. Through
its instrumental involvement in that post-war customary law
development,228 the United States indicated its support for the
principles that the treaties now encompass. Of course, the Cov-
enant and the Torture and Apartheid Conventions also ex-
panded the breadth of the human rights norms addressed at the
war's conclusion. That expansion may generate human rights
norms "which, while only conventional or contractual in... or-
igin, [have] since passed into the general corpus of international
law,... so as to have become binding even for countries which
have never, and do not, become parties to [a] [c]onvention. ' '229
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties similarly recog-
nizes this jurisprudential concept: "Nothing .. . precludes a
rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third
state [a nonparty] as a customary rule of international law, rec-
ognized as such."230 Hence, the rules embodied in the Covenant
sistent patterns of gross violations of those human rights recognized under in-
ternational law.
225. See generally id. pt. VII introductory note & § 702 comments a, c
(describing customary human rights norms binding on United States and not-
ing reliance on Universal Declaration). The comments and reporters' notes to
§ 702 more fully describe the customary law of human rights.
226. (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, (Judgment of Feb. 20)
[hereinafter Continental Shelf Cases].
227. Id. at 39, 42.
228. Regarding United States's involvement in formulating as offenses, and
prosecuting, the Axis's crimes against humanity, see supra notes 205-07 and ac-
companying text; and Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 799-
801. Regarding United States's early involvement in developing the post-War
human rights instruments, see generally L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTER-
NATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 505-22 (1973) (providing an overview
of early U.N. human rights law and noting United States's role in development
of relevant agreements).
229. Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 42. Though specifically concern-
ing the delimitation of continental shelf under a treaty on that subject, the
opinion's language suggests an approach for considering the treaty-custom re-
lationship in any context. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 102 re-
porter's note 2 (discussing Continental Shef Cases).
230. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 38, 1969 U.N. JURID.
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and the Torture and Apartheid Conventions still may bind the
United States, a nonparty to the agreements, as norms of cus-
tomary law.231 Indeed, in some instances, failure to create "an
effective remedy under state law for violation of the customary
law of human rights might itself be evidence that a violation of
rights is state policy. '23 2
2. Terrorism Law: Hijacking, Hostage Taking, and Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons
Several multinational treaties are especially important
when examining terrorist acts that affect individual lives and
thus raise human rights claims.233 For example, hijacking of-
fenses certainly may affect or injure states and corporate air-
craft owners, but they also tortiously deprive air passengers of
life, liberty, and physical integrity. Notably, two hijacking trea-
ties, the Hague and Montreal Conventions, unite to prohibit
the seizure of civil aircraft and "violence against a person on
board an aircraft. '23 5 Other significant terrorism treaties in-
Y.B. 140, 150, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679, 694 (1969) (emphasis
added).
231. Whether a treaty generates custom that binds nonobjecting nonparties
may depend on the length of time that the treaty has been in force and
whether the treaty gains widespread representative participation. Continental
Shef Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 42. The Restatement provides that treaties may lead
to the creation of custom when "agreements are intended for adherence by
states generally and are in fact widely accepted." See RESTATEMENT, SUpr
note 8, at § 102(3). Of course, applying those standards to determine whether
the Covenant and the Torture and Apartheid Conventions generate customary
law that binds the United States would involve substantial empirical research
and a determination of the United States's position toward each instrument.
Without such data, the assumption is that the United States has a commitment
to the substantive norms that those instruments contain and is bound by them.
See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text (outlining Restatements posi-
tion supporting this idea).
232. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 703 comment c.
233. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing why this Article
asserts that certain terrorist acts against individuals create human rights
claims).
234. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec.
16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hague
Convention], reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971); Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T.
565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal Convention], re-
printed in 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971). The United States became a party to the for-
mer on Sept. 14, 1971 and to the latter on Feb. 28, 1973. For simplicity, this
Article sometimes refers to the Hague Convention and the Montreal Conven-
tion as the "hijacking conventions," though the latter actually addresses of-
fenses other than hijacking committed aboard aircraft.
235. Montreal Convention, supra note 234, at art. 1 1(a), 10 I.L.M. at 1152.
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clude the Hostages Convention and the Internationally Pro-
tected Persons Convention.236  The former forbids state
coercion through hostage taking and the latter prohibits the use
of violence against certain representatives of states and interna-
tional organizations. 237 The hijacking and terrorism treaties de-
rive from the international legal order's evolving condemnation
of the use of force and violence by public and private actors.
These treaties are part of federal law because the United
States is a party to each instrument.238 Individual victims of hi-
jacking and terrorism suing their assailants in federal court
may face a major obstacle, however, because the treaties pri-
marily address the criminal liability of hijackers and ter-
rorists.2 9 The treaties do not explicitly address the rights and
remedies of individual victims in civil actions. The hijacking
and terrorism treaties are, in this sense, like the Geneva, Geno-
cide, and Apartheid Conventions. 240
B. HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS UNDER THE THREE GENUSES
1. First Genus: Express or Implied Human Rights Causes of
Action under Positive International Law
a. Davis's First Definition
In the first genus, human rights claims must present a
cause of action under positive international law to invoke sec-
tion 1331 jurisdiction. A cause of action, under Davis's initial
definition, arises when the plaintiff has a federal right.m The
relevant question thus is: does international law, as accepted by
the United States, recognize the human rights of the plaintiff
allegedly violated by the defendant?
Deriving partly from the Covenant and the Torture Con-
236. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 4,
1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979) [hereinafter Hostages Convention], adopted by G.A.
Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39), U.N. Doc. A/34/39 (1979) (United
States acceded to Jan. 6, 1985); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [here-
inafter Internationally Protected Persons Convention], adopted by G.A. Res.
3166, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 146, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), reprinted
in 13 I.L.M. 41 (1974). This Article sometimes refers to these two conventions
as the terrorism conventions.
237. Hostages Convention, supra note 236, 18 I.L.M. at 1457. Internation-
ally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 236, Annex, 13 I.L.M. at 43.
238. See authorities cited in notes 234, 236, supra.
239. See infra note 275.
240. See supra notes 216-18, 222 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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vention, United States customary law recognizes each individ-
ual's right to be free from summary execution, torture, slavery,
genocide, and apartheid. One might therefore conclude that
violations of these human rights create a cause of action under
Davis's first definition, thereby providing section 1331 jurisdic-
tion.24 3 Frequently, however, courts reject federal question ju-
risdiction over claims premised on a denial of these rights,
concluding that "[i]nternational human rights law grants no
private right of action. . . ."2" Courts have offered two ratio-
nales for that conclusion; each is unpersuasive, as this Article
will demonstrate.
i. Legal personality-First, some courts that have denied
human rights causes of action postulate that claimants lack the
legal personality to possess rights under international law.2 45
This rationale draws on Lassa Oppenheim's early perspective
that "'the subjects of the rights and duties arising from the
Law of Nations are States solely and exclusively.' "246 If states
are the exclusive subjects of international law, individuals and
other nonstate actors are merely the objects of the law. Human
rights norms, under this view, directly benefit and regulate
only state actors. "[E]ven as international law has become in-
creasingly concerned with individual rights, 2 4 7 wrote Judge
Bork, concurring in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, there
remains a "general relegation of individuals to a derivative role
in the vindication of their legal rights."24 8 Without the status to
possess rights, victims of human rights violations therefore lack
a cause of action and courts lack section 1331 jurisdiction over
their claims.
This rationale for denying federal question jurisdiction is
simplistic and flawed. Legal personality is not an all-or-nothing
concept. It is "merely a short-hand symbol which denotes that
242. See supra notes 211-32 and accompanying text.
243. See infra notes 268-14 and accompanying text (considering whether
individuals have an implied cause of action for other treaty offenses under Da-
vis's second definition).
244. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp.
542, 549-50 (D.D.C. 1981)).
245. See infra note 246.
246. E.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 817 (Bork, J., concurring) (quoting I L. OP-
PENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 19 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955)).
For more extensive treatment of this viewpoint see Brownlie, The Place of the
Individual in International Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 435, 436-40 (1964); Lauter-
pacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 LAw Q. REv. 438, 438-44 (1947).
247. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 818.
248. Id. at 817.
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an entity is endowed by international law with some legal ca-
pacities, but does not tell us what particular capacities it has.
Different kinds of 'international persons' have different capaci-
ties. ' 249 To be sure, states are the primary international actors
and have full legal personalities. Nonetheless, the states them-
selves explicitly have recognized certain basic individual rights
in the Covenant and the Torture Convention.2 0 The United
States recognizes these individual rights under customary law.
With respect to these rights, individuals surely are the subjects
of international law.
Analogizing to the United States Constitution explains fur-
ther the relative nature of individual legal personality under in-
ternational law. United States citizens may not lay and collect
taxes or regulate domestic or international commerce; such au-
thority vests solely in Congress.251 Notwithstanding these limi-
tations, because the constitutional amendments create
individual rights, individuals are not the mere objects of consti-
tutional law. Similarly, under international law, although indi-
viduals may not enter into treaties, declare war, or claim
territorial waters, they do possess at least those rights that trea-
ties and customary law have created. Individuals thus alternate
between being the subjects and objects of both national and in-
ternational law, depending on the particular legal authority or
right at issue. Indeed, the legal personality argument for re-
jecting federal jurisdiction is so fundamentally flawed that the
counterargument may be reduced to a tautology: individuals
are capable of possessing the legal rights that individuals
possess.
That international law imposes certain responsibilities on
individuals further rebuts the idea that individuals cannot pos-
sess rights. The Allies' prosecution of war criminals demon-
strates the capacity of individuals to violate international
law.25 2 In addition, most modem human rights treaties impose
criminal and sometimes civil liability on government officials
and private citizens who violate their prohibitions.25 3 If individ-
249. Lissitzyn, Territorial Entities Other than Independent States in the
Law of Treaties, 125 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 15 (1968) (footnote omitted) (em-
phasis in original).
250. See supra notes 211-15, 219 and accompanying text.
251. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
252. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
253. See generally Bassiouni, Characteristics of International Criminal
Law Conventions, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 1-9 (M. Bassiouni ed.
1986) [hereinafter Bassiouni] (describing evolution of international criminal
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uals may violate certain international norms, it follows that
they also may derive benefits from those norms. These liabili-
ties and benefits are the reciprocal halves of legal personality.
Just as courts should not reject section 1331 jurisdiction be-
cause an individual defendant lacks per se the ability to violate
international law,25 courts should not reject jurisdiction be-
cause an individual plaintiff intrinsically lacks international
rights. When human rights and terrorist offenses are at issue,
individual plaintiffs may possess a cause of action under Davis's
initial definition.
ii. Nonself-executing international law-A second ration-
ale for rejecting federal jurisdiction is that human rights law is
nonself-executing. Each human rights treaty under scrutiny
typically is viewed as nonself-executing and "incomplete... be-
cause it expressly calls for implementing legislation or... calls
for the performance of a particular affirmative act by the con-
tracting sovereigns."2 55 By analogy, the customary law of
human rights is also nonself-executing.256 Under this rationale,
human rights law, standing alone, cannot be enforced by indi-
viduals. As Judge Bork again has concluded: "Absent authoriz-
ing legislation, an individual has access to courts for
enforcement of a treaty's provisions only when it is self-execut-
ing,... when it expressly or impliedly provides a private right
of action.'2s7
Although not incorrect in form, this conclusion lacks sub-
stance. According to Judge Bork, the issue of whether a norm
is self-executing turns upon whether it provides a private cause
law creating individual responsibility particularly under treaty law). Domestic
law itself also may recognize individual liabilities and benefits under interna-
tional rules. See Randall, Further Inquiries, supra note 9, at 493-94.
254. See Randall, Further Inquiries, supra note 9, at 496-501 (demonstrat-
ing why individual defendants may violate international law in Alien Tort
Statute litigation).
255. Aerovias Interamericanas de Pan., S.A. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
197 F. Supp. 230, 245 (S.D. Fla. 1961) (footnote omitted), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Board of County Comm'rs v. Aerolineas Peruanasa, S.A.,
307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962), cert denied, 371 U.S. 961 (1963). In contrast,
"where a treaty is full and complete, it is generally considered to be self-exe-
cuting by the courts." Id. at 246 (footnote omitted). For background on non-
self-executing and self-executing treaties, see INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
203, at 198-205.
256. See D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork's Con-
cept of the Law of Nations Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92, 96-100
(1985) (critically explaining the analogy between treaties and custom).
257. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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of action. Judge Bork thus begs the essential question of
whether individuals have private causes of action for certain in-
ternational law violations. The nonself-executing rationale
leads back to square one: individuals may enforce only those
human rights norms that are self-executing, which in turn de-
pends on whether those norms supply a cause of action to
individuals.
Because Davis's first definition focused solely on whether
the plaintiff has a federally recognized right, the individual
rights to be free from summary execution, torture, slavery, ge-
nocide, and apartheid are therefore self-executing and judicially
enforceable. The Covenant, for instance, explicitly speaks in
terms of individual rights when it states: "No one shall be arbi-
trarily deprived of his life"258 and "[n]o one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment."2'a 9 Certainly, those provisions are as self-executing as
the constitutional provision enforced in the Davis case itself-
"[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. '260 Many of the Covenant's provi-
sions "are capable of direct application by the courts, or by
other competent national agencies, without any legislative ac-
tion."261 The individual rights contained in the Torture Con-
vention are similarly self-executing. Because the Covenant and
the Torture Convention have helped to establish customary
human rights law in the United States,262 such custom logically
is as self-executing and as enforceable in federal court as the
treaty provisions themselves.
Of course, article 2(2) of the Covenant requires signatories
to adopt the domestic legislation necessary to give effect to the
rights specified in the Covenant and a similar provision exists
in the Torture Convention.263 Those provisions do not, how-
ever, broadly render the treaty norms nonself-executing. In-
stead, they require only domestic implemention if necessary.264
Thus, if a court can directly apply a human rights norm under
customary or treaty law "to give effect to the individual right in
258. Covenant, supra note 211, art. 6.
259. I& art. 7.
260. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
261. Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic
Law, in INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 212, at 326.
262. See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 214-15, 220 and accompanying text.
264. See id.
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question, no legislation is required."265
Section 1331 provides a vehicle for directly applying those
norms and also satisfies the United States's customary law obli-
gation to enforce prohibitions of human rights violations.
Stripped of confusion, a cause of action under Davis's initial
definition requires only a federal right.26 6 Because national
customary law recognizes the human rights identified in the
Covenant and the Torture Convention, human rights claimants
have a valid section 1331 cause of action. Thus, the United
States need not adopt additional legislation to give effect to its
customary human rights law. As in the case of United States
constitutional rights, section 1331 jurisdiction renders human
rights protections self-executing.
In this light, the link that Judge Bork and others draw be-
tween a cause of action and self-executing norms is "unexcep-
tionable" and "harmless. '267 Human rights, like any other
legal rights, must be susceptible to direct judicial enforcement
and thus self-executing. Nevertheless, it is precisely because
Judge Bork's argument connects cause of action to self-execu-
tion that a convincing counterargument emerges. In summary
form: human rights norms are self-executing if they create a
private cause of action. Under Davis's first definition, the indi-
vidual rights to be free from summary execution, torture, slav-
ery, genocide, and apartheid create a private cause of action
when such rights are violated. Those human rights norms thus
are self-executing and a plaintiff properly may invoke federal
question jurisdiction to enforce such normative rights.
b. Davis's Second Definition
Focusing less exclusively on whether the plaintiff has a
legal right, Davis's second definition of cause of action poses
the "question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of
the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately
invoke the power of the court."268 Applying this question to
section 1331 jurisdiction over human rights claims, this Article
will follow Davis's organization, analogizing first to federal
statutory claims and then to constitutional claims.
i. Analogy to statutory claims-Federal law may explic-
265. Schachter, supra note 261, at 327.
266. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
267. See D'Amato, supra note 256, at 98.
268. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 240 n.18 (1975). See supra notes 127-36
and accompanying text; see also D'Amato, supra note 256, at 94-101.
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itly or implicitly indicate an individual's right to invoke judicial
power.26 9 The Covenant and the Torture Convention explicitly
indicate the propriety of a private cause of action.270 For exam-
ple, article 2(3) of the Covenant obligates state parties to pro-
vide remedies to individuals suffering human rights
violations.271 Similarly, the Torture Convention obligates the
state parties to examine torture allegations promptly and im-
partially,272 and to "ensure in its legal system that the victim
... obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and ade-
quate compensation."'273 By expressly contemplating judicial
remedies, both the Covenant and the Torture Convention sat-
isfy Davis's second cause of action definition. Accordingly, the
customary human rights obligations flowing from those instru-
ments, as recognized in the United States, also meet Davis's
second definition.7 4 Section 1331 jurisdiction provides a means
by which the United States may satisfy its obligation to open its
courts to victims of the offenses recognized in the Covenant
and the Torture Convention.
Neither the remaining humanitarian treaties (the Geneva,
Genocide, and Apartheid Conventions) nor the hijacking and
terrorism treaties (the Hague, Montreal, Hostages, and Interna-
tionally Protected Persons Conventions) provide explicit per-
mission to invoke judicial power.275 Under Davis's second
definition, courts must determine whether those treaties im-
plicitly permit an individual to invoke federal court jurisdic-
tion. Because the treaties primarily address criminal liability,
they may be compared to federal criminal or regulatory stat-
utes and examined under the four Cort criteria.276 That analy-
sis is particularly apt because it considers the United States
criminal statutes passed to implement the treaties to which the
nation is a party.
269. See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 212-20, 219 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
272. Torture Convention, supra note 219, art. 12, 23 I.L.M. at 1030.
273. Id. art. 14, 23 I.L.M. at 1030.
274. See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
275. Primarily penal, those conventions define the offenses at issue as
criminal and create an enforcement scheme for those offenses, usually focus-
ing on the domestic legislative, adjudicatory, and enforcement jurisdiction of
all states to redress such crimes. The treaties' overriding goals are to en-
courage state parties to work independently and collectively to prevent and to
punish human rights violations and terrorism. For general discussions of these
conventions see Bassiouni, supra note 253, at 1-13; Randall, Universal Juris-
diction, supra note 9, at 816-39.
276. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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The first criterion considers whether the plaintiff is "'one
of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,'
... that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff?"277 Because war crimes, genocide, and apartheid in-
volve acts committed against individuals, individuals are the ex-
clusive, or at least the most direct, beneficiaries of the
prohibition of those acts. Individuals, as well as state and cor-
porate actors, also benefit when international law bans hi-
jacking and terrorism. Although every case deserves individual
analysis, most human rights claims will meet Cort's first crite-
rion. Contrary to the myth that individuals are the mere ob-
jects of international law,278 individuals directly and especially
benefit from the treaty norms, thereby meeting Cort's initial
criterion.
Cart's second and third criteria consider whether a law's
legislative history and purpose implicate a private remedy.
Remedy, in this context, refers to the idea that individuals may
enforce their implied rights in court.2 9 Of course, to apply
Cart's second and third criteria fully would require examining
the complete travaux preparatoires 2so of each of the remaining
ten treaties. Determining conclusively whether each treaty's
history and purpose supports an implied private remedy might
require examining myriad other documents. 28 ' Without under-
taking that herculean task, and lacking an actual case with
which to focus the inquiry on one or two relevant treaties, this
Article offers several more general observations.
At the outset, two maxims, one of treaty construction, one
of international law, color the inquiry into whether the treaties
imply a private remedy: Treaties should be liberally construed
to meet federalism concerns;282 and states may meet their in-
277. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1974) (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)) (emphasis in Cort omitted).
278. See supra notes 245-54 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
280. Preparatory works.
281. For instance, examining every reservation taken by each state party to
each convention might be in order in addition to reviewing every domestic law
that any state party has passed pursuant to each convention and even scruti-
nizing the legislative histories of each such domestic law.
282. Several cases indicate that courts should read the word treaty in
§ 1331 liberally to include various types of international agreements because
such multilateral agreements "could have a significant bearing on this coun-
try's international relations and thus should be heard in federal court." Hy-
osung (Am.), Inc. v. Japan Air Lines Co., 624 F. Supp. 727, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
see Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1982); B. Altman & Co. v. United
States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1911). This precedent leads to the logical and more
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ternational obligations as they choose.283 The first maxim
might suggest that courts should interpret private remedies ex-
pansively and as flowing from treaties that are primarily crimi-
nal in nature, to ensure that federal courts entertain human
rights claims. Such claims, after all, involve significant federal
issues and concerns and should be heard in federal court rather
than in local state courts. Accordingly, human rights plaintiffs
might enjoy a lesser burden of proof when demonstrating the
existence of a private federal remedy. Because the second
maxim recognizes sovereign discretion in norm implementa-
tion, the relevant treaties may permit a civil judicial remedy to
be granted, just as they impliedly permit various alternative
means of implementing the norms at issue. The fact that state
parties must provide criminal remedies against international
outlaws does not contradict, but rather supports, the idea that
states may provide civil remedies to respond to such wrongdo-
ers. Inferring a private civil remedy serves the quintessential
purpose of the human rights and terrorism treaties: to prevent
and redress certain international offenses.
More particularly, several cases, although only secondary
sources of positive international law, indicate that the remain-
ing treaties provide a basis for implying a private remedy for al-
leged violations. Regarding terrorism, two cases, Von Dardel v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics28 and Letelier v. Republic
of Chile,285 are relevant. Von Dardel was brought on behalf of
Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, whom Soviet officials
unlawfully seized, imprisoned, and perhaps murdered outside
of the United States.286 In upholding jurisdiction under section
1331 and other statutory provisions, 28 7 the District Court for
the District of Columbia determined that an implied private
remedy was available to redress the violation of Wallenberg's
general suggestion that courts also should liberally interpret the substantive
provisions of a treaty when it serves federalism concerns.
283. See Randall, Further Inquiries, supra note 9, at 488-92.
284. 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985).
285. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980) (addressing jurisdictional issue only),
merits addressed in 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980) (awarding judgment for
plaintiff).
286. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 248.
287. Although the court focused on the FSIA and Alien Tort Statute, juris-
diction was available under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1331, and 1350. Von Dardel,
623 F. Supp. at 250; see also supra note 37 (discussing Amerada Hess's reliance
on Von Dardel concerning relationship between FSIA and other jurisdictional
provisions in actions against states).
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rights.288 Referring to the United States criminal statutes
passed to implement the Internationally Protected Persons and
Hostages Conventions,28 9 the court found that "Congress has
... enacted statutes designed to protect internationally pro-
tected persons, including diplomats.... as to which a private
remedy has been implied."290 Although those treaties and the
laws that implement them are expressly criminal in nature, the
court interpreted them as encompassing private remedies. The
same court suggested a similar conclusion in Letelier, in which
representatives of a former Chilean Ambassador to the United
States, who had been assassinated in Washington, D.C., brought
an action against Chile and certain terrorists. The court upheld
jurisdiction under section 1331 over several causes of action,291
including the tortious assault of "an internationally protected
person pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1116."-22 Hence, the Letelier
court apparently found that plaintiffs had an implied private
cause of action based upon the statutory implementation of the
Internationally Protected Persons Convention.
The Sixth Circuit addressed hijacking in Chumney v.
Nixon 293 and found an implied cause of action under the crimi-
nal statute that implemented the Montreal Convention.2 94
Chumney arose out of an alleged assault by one United States
citizen against another while they were flying over Brazil.2 95
The issue on appeal was whether the federal assault statute,
which Congress, pursuant to the Montreal Convention, had ex-
tended to apply to offenses committed on aircraft,29 6 implied a
private cause of action.2 97 The Sixth Circuit answered affirma-
288. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 261-62.
289. 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. IV 1986).
290. Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 254 (emphasis added); see also id at 259
(when well-being of diplomat was violated, English and American common
law recognized private cause of action and this "right to sue has recently been
reaffirmed by Congress ....").
291. The Court upheld jurisdiction over Chile under the FSIA. Letelier,
488 F. Supp. at 665. The court upheld jurisdiction over the nonstate defend-
ants under §§ 1331 and 1350, as summarily indicated in Letelier, 502 F. Supp. at
266.
292. Letelier, 502 F. Supp. at 260 n.1.
293. 615 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1980).
294. Id. at 391.
295. Id. at 390.
296. See 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1982) (establishing punishment guidelines for as-
saults committed within maritime and territorial jurisdiction); 49 U.S.C.
§ 1472(k)(1) (1982) (extending 18 U.S.C. § 113 to same acts committed aboard
aircraft within special aircraft jurisdiction of United States).
297. Chumney, 615 F.2d at 390.
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tively under Cort's criteria and upheld section 1331 jurisdic-
tion.298 Although finding no legislative intent either to support
or to preclude an implied private cause of action, the court held
that Congress's "clear-cut purpose" was to protect the safety of
certain air travellers.299 In light of Cort's second and third cri-
teria, the Chumney court concluded that "[a] civil action for
damages would certainly be consistent with the overall congres-
sional purpose and we believe should be inferred therefrom."3°°
The court added that "the existence or nonexistence of a civil
cause of action in this case may create a legal precedent which
will affect other possible fact situations (aircraft kidnapping or
terrorism) some of which may well cry out for more than the
criminal remedy."301
Filartiga v. Pena-1rala302 supports the view that a private
remedy may exist for certain human rights violations. The Fi-
lartiga court sustained jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Stat-
ute after concluding that extraterritorial torture violates the
law of nations.303 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied
heavily on human rights instruments that created no explicit
cause of action.30 4 In dictum, the Filartiga court "recognize[d]
that our reasoning might also sustain jurisdiction under... 28
U.S.C. section 1331."305 Although the recently enacted Torture
Convention today creates an explicit cause of action, Filartiga's
dictum suggests that section 1331 jurisdiction extends over
other human rights violations, such as genocide, apartheid, and
war crimes, even absent an explicit private remedy, because
only an implied cause of action for torture was available when
Filartiga was decided. Judge Edwards's concurring opinion in
Tel-Oren bolsters Filartiga's view. Judge Edwards suggested
298. Id at 391.
299. Id. at 394 (protecting passengers flying on United States airlines or
foreign aircraft either departing from or intending to land at United States
airports).
300. Id. But see In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d
400, 404-08 (9th Cir. 1983) (indicating that Chumney contradicts a majority
view).
301. Chumney, 615 F.2d at 395.
302. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
303. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
304. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881-84. The court rejected the contention
that only directly self-executing instruments are binding in federal courts. See
id. at 883. Even if a treaty does not, standing alone, create a cause of action
cognizable in a United States court, it may be "evidence of an emerging norm
of customary international law," id at 880 n.7, and may help create expecta-
tions about the protection of individual rights. Id. at 883.
305. Id. at 887 n.22.
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that "persons may be susceptible to civil liability if they com-
mit either a [universal crime] or an offense that comparably vi-
olates norms of international law. °3 0 6 The offenses Judge
Edwards envisioned included genocide, slavery, and systematic
racial discrimination.30 7
Finally, assuming that a human rights claimant has an im-
plied right and remedy under Cort's first three criteria, the last
criterion likely will support an implied private cause of action.
The fourth criterion addresses federalism concerns and consid-
ers whether an implied federal cause of action intrudes "in an
area basically the concern of the [domestic] States. ' 30 8 Because
matters of foreign affairs and international law exemplify an
area of federal concern,30 9 the final Cort criterion supports fed-
eral jurisdiction over human rights claims, under Davis's sec-
ond definition of cause of action.310
ii. Analogy to constitutional claims-The Davis court
held that its second definition of cause of action should apply
leniently to constitutional claims.3 11 The propriety of federal
court jurisdiction over constitutional claims should be pre-
sumed, especially in the absence of an alternative forum for
such claims. 3' 2 The relevant question therefore is whether
human rights claims resemble constitutional claims for pur-
poses of federal jurisdiction.
Under the supremacy clause, constitutional law claims may
be more important than, and thus distinguishable from, inter-
national law claims.313 Constitutional and international claims,
306. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) (first emphasis added), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1003
(1985). Judge Edwards's suggestion, made in the Alien Tort Statute context,
however, provides less support for § 1331 jurisdiction over human rights claims
than the Filartiga dictum. Although the Filartiga court viewed §§ 1331 and
1350 as coterminous, Judge Edwards distinguished the two provisions, indicat-
ing that only § 1331 requires a private cause of action under international law.
See ic. at 779 n.4.
307. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (referring to list of offenses in RESTATEMENT,
supra note 8, § 702).
308. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1974).
309. See, e.g., infra notes 326-27 and accompanying text; see also Schachter,
International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Policies, 24 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 63, 63-65 (1978) (discussing central role that human rights played in
Carter administration foreign policy).
310. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
311. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 1979).
312. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
313. Constitutional norms are superior to international norms under the
supremacy clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
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however, compare more closely if the latter category is nar-
rowed to the subset of human rights claims. Human rights
claims parallel individual constitutional claims because of the
primacy of the rights at issue. There is an obvious overlapping
of the first principles involved in both types of claims; the in-
ternational claims may involve even more basic, and thus more
compelling, fundamental rights than the constitutional claims.
Indeed, constitutional rights may subsume every human right.
The rights to be free from terror and from human rights viola-
tions emanate from international documents as basic to the
world legal order as the Constitution is to the United States
legal system.
Assuming that constitutional claims and human rights
claims are analogous, then Davis's more liberal interpretation
of cause of action applies to both. This argument supports the
presumption that human rights claimants may invoke the fed-
eral court's power; rebutting that presumption should become
the defendant's responsibility. Presuming the existence of a
cause of action and section 1331 jurisdiction is especially appro-
priate in light of the dearth of alternative forums in which to
commence human rights actions.
3 14
2. Second Genus: Human Rights Causes of Action that
Federal Judges Create or Adopt
When a court uses the more demanding of Davis's defini-
tions of cause of action, and when it is unclear whether the pos-
itive law of a specific human rights norm, standing alone,
creates a private cause of action, the second genus becomes rel-
evant. Under the second genus, section 1331 jurisdiction exists
over human rights claims if the district court creates a federal
314. See infra notes 388, 402 and accompanying text. Granted, Davis indi-
cated that the presumption of a private judicial remedy is proper when a par-
ticular issue is not committed explicitly to the executive or congressional
branches, see supra note 135 and accompanying text, and it is possible to argue
that human rights and terrorism issues are committed to those political
branches. However, "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy
which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). Both Baker, 369 U.S. at 211, and Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964), actually support the federal ju-
diciary's involvement in human rights claims. Consequently, they support the
presumption of private judicial remedies for such claims, because the rela-
tively clear and well-codified executive and congressional policy in the human
rights and terrorism areas permits the judiciary to speak in unison with its co-
ordinate branches when it recognizes private causes of action for human rights
claims. See also supra note 20 (distinguishing questions of whether court has
jurisdiction from whether court should exercise it).
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common-law cause of action or if it adopts a nonfederal cause of
action under the protective jurisdiction theory.31, 5
a. Federal Common Law of Human Rights
Establishing a human rights cause of action under federal
common law requires both that human rights claims merit fed-
eral decisional law and that the federal judiciary reasonably can
craft a human rights cause of action.316
i. The need for federal common law--"Specialized" fed-
eral common law usually should regulate issues involving inter-
national law and foreign relations because they affect uniquely
national interests. The Supreme Court's opinion in Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino31 7 supports this conclusion. In Sab-
batino, the Court considered whether the act of state doctrine,
a judicial abstention device, precluded a United States court
from examining the legality of the Castro government's expro-
priation of sugar in Cuba.318 According to the Court, certain in-
ternational issues occupy one of the post-Erie "enclaves of
federal judge-made law."319 The act of state doctrine fell
within the post-Erie enclaves because it ordered and affected
the United States's "relationships with other members of the
international community" and, as such, "must be treated exclu-
sively as an aspect of federal law. '320
The Sabbatino Court based its holding on the express con-
stitutional delegation of foreign affairs and international law
powers to federal control.3 2' Going beyond the act of state doc-
trine, however, the Court generally "found in the Constitution
a mandate to fashion a federal law of foreign relations. ' 322 In-
deed, Sabbatino exemplifies Professor Hill's "constitutional
315. See supra notes 137-88 and accompanying text. For the purpose of
considering human rights claims under this genus, the analysis assumes the
second of Davis's cause of action definitions.
316. See generally supra notes 138-60 and accompanying text.
317. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
318. Id. That doctrine, which may counsel a court not to exercise jurisdic-
tion, see supra note 20, is discussed in Randall, Civil Jurisdiction, supra note
9, at 104-06 and Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 325 (1986). Although Sabbatino's approach to the act of state doctrine re-
mains controlling, the "Second Hickenlooper Amendment," 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2) (1982), reversed the conclusion in Sabbatino-that the act of state
doctrine applies to issues involving a foreign state's expropriation of private
property.
319. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 426.
320. Id. at 425.
321. See Hill, supra note 158, at 1061-67.
322. Friendly, supra note 143, at 408 n.19.
1988]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
preemption" theory, mentioned earlier.32 United States' rela-
tions "with foreign states constitute an area of exclusive federal
competence; ... insofar as such relations become involved in ju-
dicial controversy, the controlling law is that proclaimed by the
federal judiciary."32 Hence, federal courts have "controlling
competence, vis-&-vis the [domestic] state courts, to decide ques-
tions of international law."325
In light of Sabbatino, federal decisional law should cer-
tainly regulate human rights claims. Human rights violations
and terrorism figure prominently on the federal government's
international agenda. The executive and congressional devo-
tion to those subjects is evidenced by myriad laws, treaties, or-
ders, speeches, and political messages; even the United States's
foreign-assistance and arms dealings depend partly upon the
other state's human rights record and approach to terrorism. 32 6
Such prescriptions illustrate that the human rights and terror-ism areas embody primary national interests, which, in turn,
support the federal judiciary's lawmaking authority over
human rights claims. The executive branch's occasional expres-
sions of its views on human rights cases to the judiciary327 also
indicate the need for a body of federal decisional law; the exec-
utive branch is more accustomed to communicating with its co-
ordinate judicial branch than with local state courts and can
thus better affect the common-lawmaking process. In sum, if
Sabbatino "imposes a 'federal common law' upon cases in which
the court finds a national interest so strong that a judge-made
federal rule of decision preempts the [local] state law, '328 then
human rights cases categorically demand federal decisional law.
ii. The content of federal common law-Assuming that
federal common law governs human rights claims, the content
of that law still requires examination. How, specifically, do
judges create federal common law to produce a human rights
cause of action? Depending on the character and status of the
323. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (discussing Professor
Hill's theory of constitutional preemption).
324. Hill, supra note 158, at 1056.
325. Id. at 1025.
326. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 702 reporters' note 10; Schachter,
supra note 309, at 79-87; see also Roberts, Reagan Aides Call Human Rights
'Agenda Item No. 1' at the Summit, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1988, at Al, col. 4 (dis-
cussing Reagan-Gorbachev summit).
327. See Randall, Further Inquiries, supra note 9, at 530 (discussing the ex-
ecutive branch's involvement in Filartiga and Tel-Oren through amicus briefs).
328. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 647 F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir.
1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
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treaty at issue, a cause of action arises either from the custom-
ary law affiliated with a treaty or from the interstices of a
treaty. The fact that the judicial invention of human rights
causes of action varies from case to case is consistent with Lin-
coln Mills's conception of federal common law: "The range of
judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the
problem. 329
The analysis begins with the Covenant and the Torture
Convention. Because both instruments explicitly recognize a
cause of action,330 a judge need not create individual rights and
private judicial remedies. Instead, because neither instrument
is in force in the United States, a court should determine
whether the Covenant and the Torture Convention support a
customary law cause of action cognizable in the United States.
As analyzed above, through the Covenant's and the Torture
Convention's codification and crystallization of certain custom-
ary norms and their generation of others, the federal govern-
ment arguably has an obligation to recognize private causes of
action under the customary law affiliated with those instru-
ments. That customary-law obligation is met by the judiciary's
recognition of common-law causes of action in human rights
cases. Such common-law causes of action may support section
1331 jurisdiction, as Filartiga v. Pena-Irala suggests in the case
of torture.33 1 A California district court made a similar sugges-
tion concerning a former Argentine general's commission of
prolonged arbitrary detention and summary execution.332
Conversely, the Geneva, Genocide, Hague, Montreal, Hos-
tages, and Internationally Protected Persons Conventions,
though currently in force in the United States, do not explicitly
create a private cause of action.333 Hence, under these treaties,
courts perform a more traditional lawmaking function; the ab-
sence of an express cause of action requires federal judges to
find or create a private right and remedy for section 1331 juris-
diction to exist. With minimal strain, however, a judge may
329. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
330. See supra text accompanying notes 215, 241-42, 270-74. Sources other
than the Covenant and the Torture Convention also buttress the United
States's customary law obligation to recognize private remedies for the human
rights violations at issue. See supra notes 224-25, 232 and accompanying text.
331. 630 F.2d at 876, 885-87 (2d Cir. 1980).
332. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1543-44 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(holding that federal common law supports § 1331 jurisdiction over certain
human rights violations).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 238-40.
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find individual rights within the interstices of these treaties.
The design of the Geneva and Genocide Conventions and, to
some extent, the hijacking and terrorism treaties is to protect
individuals from heinous and depraved acts. Indeed, the trea-
ties arguably entitle individuals to freedom from such offenses;
the intent of, and sentiments behind, these instruments dictates
judicial recognition of individual rights. In Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee,3- the Supreme Court upheld the creation, under
federal common law, of private rights for interstate water pol-
lution because such rights were consistent with the goals of fed-
eral environmental legislation.3 5 Similarly, creating private
rights, under federal common law, for war crimes, genocide, hi-
jacking, and terrorism is consistent with the first principles of
United States treaties.
Assuming the creation of such private rights, it follows di-
rectly that federal judges also should create private remedies
for violations of those rights; it is, afterall, "not uncommon for
federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are
concerned. '33 6 As well-phrased by an early maxim, the "very
essence of civil liberty" is to provide a "remedy for the violation
of a vested legal right. '33 7 To give full remedial effect to the
rights at issue, human rights plaintiffs should have access to
federal courts. Judicial creation of human rights remedies is
logical, given the discretion that international law affords to
states in satisfying their commitments.338 Although the afore-
mentioned treaties oblige state parties to create criminal reme-
dies for war crimes, genocide, hijacking, and terrorism, they
also may permit state parties to create private judicial remedies
for those offenses. Providing private common-law remedies for
human rights violations and terrorism furthers the treaties'
commitment to prevent and redress such offenses. Customary
law also supports creating such remedies. 339 Moreover, because
creating private rights and remedies actually may overlap with
inferring a private cause of action, section 1331 jurisdiction in
the present genus may draw support from some of the argu-
ments made under the first genus.30
334. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 149-56.
336. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
337. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
338. See Randall, Further Inquiries, supra note 9, at 488-92.
339. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 703 comment C.
340. See supra notes 277-310 and accompanying text; see also supra notes
156-57 and accompanying text.
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The Apartheid Convention, as a prospective source of fed-
eral common law, presents both sets of problems that the other
treaties raise. It is not in force in the United States and it does
not explicitly create a private cause of action.341 To create a
common law cause of action for apartheid, the federal judge
therefore first must find that the Apartheid Convention gener-
ates customary law in the United States, and, second, must de-
rive a private cause of action from that customary law. Given
the distance between those judicial tasks and the positive law,
federal judges may be reluctant to create private rights and
remedies emanating from the Apartheid Convention. Because
the Covenant explicitly creates a private cause of action for at
least certain types of racial discrimination,342 the Covenant may
provide victims of apartheid with a more useful basis of section
1331 jurisdiction.
b. Human Rights under Protective Jurisdiction
As previously argued, the protective jurisdiction theory
supports section 1331 jurisdiction over nonfederal causes of ac-
tion, at least in cases involving the strong article I interests that
arise in the area of foreign policy.343 This subsection argues
further that such protective jurisdiction is especially appropri-
ate over human rights claims.
Courts may invoke protective jurisdiction legitimately over
human rights claims because the cases implicate clear and
unique foreign policy interests. With the possible exception of
certain international law disputes to which the federal govern-
ment is a party, no cases implicate foreign policy concerns as
significantly as those involving human rights violations or ter-
rorism. The topics of human rights and terrorism entail issues
central to the nation's foreign policy, and the judiciary's han-
dling of those issues directly indicates the federal government's
responsiveness and commitment to such issues. Given the simi-
larity between the federal common-law and protective jurisdic-
tion theories,344 the rationale behind employing federal
common law to govern human rights claims also supports pro-
tective jurisdiction over those claims.
341. See supra notes 218, 275 and accompanying text.
342. See Covenant, supra note 211, arts. 8, 24-27, at 54-56. Th1e provisions
prohibiting racial discrimination give rise to a private cause of action when
they are violated. See i& art. 2(3)(b), at 53.
343. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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Protective jurisdiction is appropriate over human rights
claims even under Professor Mishkin's restrictive theory.3A5
Mishkin's formulation, which extends protective jurisdiction
only to areas involving "an articulated and active federal pol-
icy," is easily satisfied in the human rights and terrorism con-
texts.3 6 Although the United States could be more consistent
in its condemnation of human rights violations and terrorism,
the federal policy against such acts is generally well articulated
and promoted. For instance, the federal legislation implement-
ing the hijacking and terrorism treaties commits the United
States to prosecute or extradite individuals in its custody who
commit those crimes, even when a particular offense bears no
direct connection to the United States.3 7 Other recent exam-
ples of legislative efforts aimed at mitigating human rights vio-
lations and terrorism include the Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Antiterrorism Act of 198638 and the Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act.3 9 One title of the former act addresses the crimi-
nal punishment of terrorists, while another dictates federal
compensation for victims employed by the United States civil
or military services.-50 The torture statute, currently pending,
would provide a new basis of district court jurisdiction over
civil cases involving torture or extrajudicial killings.351
Even if such positive law alone does not yet create a pri-
vate cause of action, it illustrates the federal government's ex-
press and expansive policy of meting out justice in the
antiterrorism and human rights contexts. In concert with that
articulated foreign policy, and thus supported by article I pow-
ers and concerns, the federal judiciary should use the protective
jurisdiction theory in section 1331 cases involving human rights
claims. Assuming that Congress does not provide rules of deci-
sion sufficient to govern human rights claims, federal courts
345. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
346. Mishkin, supra note 82, at 192. For discussions of protective jurisdic-
tion in the context of the Alien Tort Statute, see Casto, supra note 44, at 512-
25; Note, supra note 163, at 1018-24.
347. See generally Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 816-34
(discussing hijacking and terrorism treaties' prosecute-or-extradite language
and noting federal legislation implementing those treaties).
348. Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (codified in scattered titles and sec-
tions as described in 22 U.S.C. § 4801 (Supp. IV 1986)).
349. S. 824, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1417, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
350. See, respectively, titles XII (18 U.S.C. § 2331 (Supp. IV 1986)) and VIII
(37 U.S.C. § 1013 (Supp. IV 1986)) of the Act.
351. If enacted, that statute would become 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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might rely upon choice-of-law considerations in adopting a
nonfederal cause of action. Civil disputes involving human
rights violations and terrorist acts resemble tort cases. There-
fore, under the e loci approach, for example, the situs's law
should be adopted to regulate plaintiff's cause of action and re-
solve the substantive issues.3 5 2
3. Third Genus: Human Rights Cases as Involving
Substantial Issues of Federal Law
The third genus requires no federal cause of action, but,
under Laborers Vacation Trust, only that "some substantial,
disputed question of federal law is a necessary element" of the
nonfederal claim.3 53 A recent Second Circuit opinion, Republic
of Philippines v. Marcos,3M illustrates the third genus's applica-
bility in cases with international implications. In Marcos, the
Philippines attempted to enjoin transfer of certain New York
properties, allegedly purchased with funds illegally appropri-
ated by its deposed President.3 55
The Marcos court upheld section 1331 jurisdiction, even
though it found that "on the face of the complaint" the case
was brought "under a theory more nearly akin to a state cause
of action for conversion." 5 6 After noting a probable federal
common-law basis for the action, the court particularly held
that "'the presence of a federal issue in a state-created cause of
action' ,,-17 supported jurisdiction. More specifically, the con-
version claim raised, "as a necessary element, the question
whether to honor the request of a foreign government that the
American courts enforce the foreign government's directives to
freeze property in the United States subject to future process in
the foreign state."' 58 Although Marcos was a section 1331 case,
the Second Circuit implicitly adopted the approach used in Ver-
linden, an FSIA case.35 9 Recall, however, that Verlinden, in
352. See generally Randall, Further Inquiries, supra note 9, at 534-38 (ana-
lyzing how choice-of-law principles might regulate human rights tort cases).
353. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).
See supra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
354. 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 2178 (1987).
355. Id at 346-47.
356. Id- at 354.
357. Id. at 354 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,
478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986)).
358. I&
359. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 199-
201 and accompanying text. The comparison to Verlinden is this Author's; the
Marcos court did not make it expressly.
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the heritage of Osborn, required only a federal issue, not a fed-
eral cause of action, because the case involved a statute other
than section 1331. Hence, under Marcos, mere federal question
ingredients, rather than a federal cause of action, may satisfy
section 1331 after all. Marcos thus brings the section 1331 case
law full circle back to Osborn, rendering section 1331 indistin-
guishable from other grants of arising under jurisdiction.
Apparently, article III supports section 1331 jurisdiction in
all conversion cases involving a foreign sovereign, just as it sup-
ports FSIA jurisdiction in all contract cases involving a foreign
sovereign. As Verlinden noted, such actions "raise sensitive is-
sues concerning the foreign relations of the United States, and
the primacy of federal concerns is evident.' ' 360 Issues of that
ilk, the Marcos court echoed, must "be decided with uniformity
as a matter of federal law,... regardless of whether the overall
claim is viewed as one of federal or state common law."'361
Marcos certainly suggests a liberal approach to the third
genus in cases with significant foreign relations implications.
Even if Marcos, like Verlinden, extends only to cases involving
foreign sovereigns, its jurisdictional ruling at least applies to
human rights cases against states. If federal courts follow
Amerada Hess, and if the FSIA is not the exclusive jurisdic-
tional vehicle against state defendants, a liberal interpretation
of section 1331 could provide a useful alternative to the FSIA in
human rights cases.362 Marcos's view of section 1331 should
not, however, extend only to cases in which a state is a party.
Because the court predicated its holding on foreign relations
implications, any dispute satisfying that predicate should sup-
port section 1331 jurisdiction over state and nonstate actors
alike.
Most human rights cases meet Laborers Vacation Trust's
"necessary" and "substantial" federal issue requirement, partic-
ularly if Marcos colors that standard. Indeed, although resting
upon federal common law grounds, a recent decision involving
human rights violations in Argentina referred to the generous
section 1331 standard operable in cases that implicate interna-
tional law issues3 63 Even when human rights causes of action
360. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983).
361. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 354 (citation omitted).
362. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court,
however, has granted certiorari in Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine
Republic. See 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
363. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd
on rehearing, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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arise under nonfederal law, numerous and significant federal
issues require resolution in section 1331 cases. These federal is-
sues include, for example, whether diplomatic, consular, or
head-of-state status entitles a defendant to jurisdictional immu-
nity; whether judicial authority is legitimate under interna-
tional law's jurisdictional principles; whether the act of state
doctrine precludes judicial review of acts committed under
color of state authority within the sovereign's territory;
whether procedural aspects of a case violate an individual de-
fendant's rights under international law; and whether, and to
what extent, international law influences and informs
nonfederal tort standards. Human rights cases presenting those
and other substantial issues may well implicate foreign rela-
tions and thus merit federal jurisdiction. Therefore, even when
nonfederal law, such as the situs's tort law, governs a human
rights cause of action, section 1331 jurisdiction should prevail
under the third genus.
IV. DOMESTIC JURISDICTION AND THE HUMAN
RIGHTS PARADIGM
Every inquiry about jurisdiction essentially concerns the
division of authority among different legal and political institu-
tions.36 Accordingly, as argued above, in the section 1331
human rights context, the federal judiciary has legitimate au-
thority in relation both to its coordinate branches and to local
state courts. Within the domestic legal system, separation of
powers and federalism concerns justify such adjudicatory juris-
diction. Human rights claims, however, also obviously impli-
cate concerns of the international legal system. Human rights
claims often involve foreign state and nonstate actors, extrater-
ritorial acts, and substantive international law. This Article's
jurisdictional inquiry, therefore, should consider whether the
federal judiciary legitimately has authority over human rights
claims not just vis-a-vis the United States's legal system, but
also vis-a-vis the world legal order.
Drawing on the universality principle and other doctrines
that give priority to human rights and terrorism norms, this
Part demonstrates the propriety of domestic jurisdiction over
364. R. FALU, THE ROLE OF DoMESTIc CouRTs IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 21 (1964). This Article's emphasis is, of course, on judicial or
adjudicatory jurisdiction, although other types of functional authority, such as
legislative and executive authority, also exist. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8,
§ 401.
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those norms under international law. This Part argues, more-
over, that post-World War II developments have altered the
very structure of the world legal order, so that it now encom-
passes the human rights paradigm. Domestic courts appropri-
ately function as the double agents of that paradigm by
enforcing individual rights central to the world legal order.
A. THE UNVER=SALITY PRINCIPLE
International law provides principles that determine when
a state legitimately has jurisdiction over offenses affecting more
than one state. A domestic court may have jurisdiction under
the territoriality or objective territoriality principle,365 the na-
tionality principle,366 the passive personality principle,36 7 and
the protective principle.368 These principles, all premised on di-
rect connections between the forum and the offense, 369 do not
support human rights jurisdiction in cases involving exclusively
foreign actors and entirely extraterritorial acts. As a result,
only a final jurisdictional basis, the universality principle, legiti-
mizes judicial authority in such human rights cases. Because
the universality principle does not require a nexus between the
forum and the offense, it provides every state with jurisdiction
over certain egregious acts, regardless of the offense's situs and
the parties' nationalities.3 70 Universal jurisdiction extends over
a limited array of offenses that strike at the foundations and
first principles of the world legal order. Commission of a uni-
365. The territoriality and objective territoriality principles apply to of-
fenses that occur within the state or intentionally have effects within that
state. See INTERNATIONAL LAW, .supra note 203, at 828-29.
366. The nationality principle applies to offenses committed by one who is
a national of the state. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 402 comment b.
367. The passive personality principle applies to offenses involving a victim
who is a national of the state. See, e.g., United States v. Wright-Basker, 784
F.2d 161, 167 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986).
368. The protective principle applies when an offense threatens the state's
security or a basic governmental function. See INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra
note 203, at 855-56. The protective principle of jurisdiction under international
law is distinct from Mishkin and Wechsler's theory of protective jurisdiction
under federal law, discussed in Parts H and III. See supra notes 343-52 and
accompanying text.
369. Those principles, dealing "with the propriety of exercises of jurisdic-
tion by a state, and the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction between states,"
RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 401 comment b, are further addressed in INTER-
NATIONAL LAw, supra note 203, ch. 10, M. McDOUGAL & W.M. REiSMAN, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw IN CONTEMPORARY PERsPECTIVE, ch. XI-XII (1981), and 0.
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, ch. XII (1982).
370. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 788. That Article fo-
cused on the universality principle in the criminal setting.
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versal offense renders a defendant hostis humani generis, that
is, an enemy of all humanity, whose act concerns every state.
Consequently, each nation has authority to respond to those
offenses.371
Universal jurisdiction recently has expanded to include the
acts that this Article discusses. Although piracy and slave trad-
ing represent archetypal universal offenses, the Allied tribu-
nals also used the universality principle, in part, to justify
prosecuting crimes against peace, war crimes, and genocidal
acts.372 In addition, universal jurisdiction applies to offenses ad-
dressed by the Geneva, Apartheid, Torture, Hague, Montreal,
Hostages, and Internationally Protected Persons Conventions.
Those treaties obligate state parties to prosecute or extradite
individuals who commit the offenses at issue, regardless of any
forum-offense nexus.373 Such obligations draw on the univer-
sality principle by committing state parties to extradite or pros-
ecute offenders with whom they have no connection. Such
universal jurisdiction may extend even to nonparties to the
conventions. According to the Restatement, under customary
law, every state has universal jurisdiction over at least the fol-
lowing: piracy; slave trade; attacks on, or hijacking of, aircraft;
genocide; and certain terrorist acts.374
Although traditional dogma held that international juris-
dictional principles regulated only domestic criminal authority,
it is now recognized that those principles also extend to civil
371. See id. at 788-90.
372. See id. at 800-10. Israeli courts also drew upon the universality princi-
ple in Eichmann's prosecution. See id. at 810-15.
373. See id. at 816-19. A few caveats are necessary concerning the prose-
cute-or-extradite commitment: it applies to only "grave breaches" of the Ge-
neva Conventions; it permits, but does not obligate, the exercise of universal
jurisdiction over nonextradited offenders specifically under the Apartheid
Convention; and it may be interpreted narrowly and is not necessarily depen-
dent on the universality principle. See id. Although the Covenant, supra note
211, does not contain the prosecute-or-extradite language, the relevant sub-
stantive norms in that instrument, see supra note 213 and accompanying text,
overlap with the norms contained in the Geneva, Torture, and Apartheid Con-
ventions, see supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
374. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 404 note 1. Universal jurisdiction
over genocide exists under customary law, but not explicitly under the Geno-
cide Convention. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 9, at 834-37. For
a discussion of the means, apart from customary law, of extending permissive
universal jurisdiction to nonparties over the offenses that the Restatement
identifies, see 0. SCHACHTr, supra note 369, at 263; Randall, Universal Juris-
diction, supra note 9, at 823-29. Each of the sources cited in this footnote sug-
gests that the universal jurisdiction of state nonparties to the conventions is
permissible, but not obligatory.
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disputes. 375 Both the Restatement376 and recent case law recog-
nize the extension of universal jurisdiction to the civil con-
text.377 The Second Circuit's conclusion in Filartiga, a civil
action, illustrates this recognition: "the torturer has become-
like the pirate and slave trader before him--hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind. ' 378 The normative expan-
sion and extension of the universality principle to civil cases
permits section 1331 jurisdiction over human rights claims
under international law. The federal judiciary's authority in
this context is thus legitimate in relation to the world legal or-
der. Indeed, because modern universal jurisdiction largely de-
rives from treaties obligating states to prosecute or extradite
375. Conventionally, in civil cases, limits on international jurisdiction were
left "to the states themselves for determination, each in accordance with its
own internal law," Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law
Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 REcuEL DEs CouRs 1,
218 (1957), particularly under domestic choice-of-law rules. Because, interna-
tional law's jurisdictional principles are to preclude and mediate conflicting
state assertions of authority, however, see supra note 369, they are relevant re-
gardless of whether such conflicts may arise in criminal or civil contexts. A
civil case, for example, involving the extraterritorial act of a foreign state or a
foreign state's national obviously may raise jurisdictional protests and have a
negative impact on relations between the United States and the foreign state.
The equal applicability of the jurisdictional principles in criminal and civil
cases also results because the same domestic laws may give rise to both types
of cases; this is true not only in terrorism cases, see, e.g., supra notes 284-301
and accompanying text, but also in United States securities and antitrust cases.
For evidence that jurisdictional conflicts may arise in the securities and anti-
trust cases, see, for example, Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the
United States Antitrust Laws, 1957 BRrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146, and Note, The Ju-
dicial Role in Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: Vesco, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 192 (1974). Comment b to § 421 of the
new Restatement takes the position that international law regulates domestic
court jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases. See generally Maier, Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private
International Law, 76 Am. J. INT'L. L. 280 (1982) (discussing fact that both
public and private systems of international law necessarily are based on same
values).
376. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 404 comment b.
377. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (voting to dismiss action, but making sev-
eral references to domestic jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses under
universality principle), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (presenting analogy between defendant-
torturer and pirates and slave traders); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C. 1985) (referring to "concept of ex-
traordinary judicial jurisdiction over acts in violation of significant interna-
tional standards ... embodied in the principle of 'universal' violations of
international law").
378. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 980.
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offenders, the federal courts arguably are required to assume
authority over human rights claims where section 1331 jurisdic-
tion exists.
B. OTHER DoCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS
Other doctrinal developments have matched the universal-
ity principle's categorical expansion. Based on the world com-
munity's ardent condemnation of human rights violations and
terrorism, those prohibitions have become obligations erga
omnes and jus cogens norms. The International Court of Jus-
tice illuminated the concept of obligations erga omnes, literally
obligations "flowing to all," in its renowned dictum in Barce-
lona Traction.3 7 9 As the court explained, in contrast to a state's
obligations "arising vis-&-vis another state," obligations erga
omnes "are the concern of all States. In view of the importance
of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal in-
terest in their protection.... . 3 8 o Those obligations stem from
both "general international law" and "international instru-
ments of a universal or quasi-universal character. 3 81 For ex-
ample, they "derive from the outlawing of acts of aggression,
and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concern-
ing the basic rights of the human person, including protection
from slavery and racial discrimination."382 Somewhat similarly,
jus cogens literally means "compelling law." The jus cogens
doctrine refers to certain peremptory norms "accepted and rec-
ognized by the international community of States as a whole
... from which no derogation is permitted.' 'asa Treaties con-
flicting with such norms are void.384 Jus cogens norms overlap
with the examples of erga omnes obligations mentioned in Bar-
celona Traction.385
379. Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Feb. 5).
380. Id. at 33 (dictum). The court's overall opinion, however, contains
some ambiguity regarding the erga omnes doctrine, as discussed in 0.
SCHACHTER, supra note 369, at 195-99.
381. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32.
382. Id
383. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 230, art. 53, 8
I.L.M. at 698-99.
384. Id., 8 I.L.M. at 698.
385. An authoritative list of jus cogens norms is nonexistent. Nonetheless,
the general overlapping of Barcelona Traction's examples of obligations erga
omnes, see supra note 382 and accompanying text, with examples of jus cogens
is illustrated in Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens As Formu-
lated by the International Law Commission, 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 946 (1967), and
Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International Law, with a Projected List, 7 GA. J.
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Apart from their specific functional applications, the
universality. principle and the erga omnes and jus cogens doc-
trines together have helped to give hierarchical order to inter-
national norms. Just as some constitutional rights are deemed
more fundamental than others,8 6 some international rights are
more fundamentally significant to the world legal order.38 7 The
individual rights discussed in this Article commonly appear on
the lists of universal offenses, obligations erga omnes, and jus
cogens norms. As such, these rights inhabit the apex of inter-
national law's normative hierarchy, and all global actors need
to be vigilant in guarding and enforcing them.
The lofty status of those norms legitimizes federal court ju-
risdiction over human rights claims. Especially because the In-
ternational Court of Justice lacks jurisdiction over individual
claims,388 juridical credence is paid to fundamental interna-
tional norms when section 1331 authority is assumed over
human rights cases. Prolific codification and sustained consen-
sus condemning both human rights violations and terrorism
within the world legal order dictate domestic court adjudication
in these critical areas.38 9 The compulsory nature of the erga
omnes and jus cogens doctrines may suggest that domestic juris-
diction over human rights claims is not only legitimate, but also
obligatory. Because each state has an obligation to all other
INT'L & COMP. L. 609 (1977). For a recent, valuable study of jus cogens, see
Christenson, Jus Cogen" Guarding Interests Fundamental to International
Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585 (1988).
386. Just one example is the equal protection area, in which certain funda-
mental rights trigger a stricter scrutiny of governmental behavior than other
rights. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-7 to 16-
12 (2d ed. 1988) (analyzing impact of fundamental rights on equal protection
model).
387. See generally Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts be-
tween Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1134-50
(1985) (describing fundamental principles of international law contained in
any hierarchy of legal norms); Meron, On a Hierarchy of International
Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1986) (analyzing legal implications of dif-
ferentiating between fundamental and other norms); Weil, Towards Relative
Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983) (describing
and criticizing creation of qualitative ordering of international legal norms).
388. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 210, art. 34, at 1059 (allowing, with lim-
ited exceptions for international organizations, only states to be parties before
I.C.J.).
389. See R. FALK, supra note 364, at 9-10 (arguing that greater interna-
tional community support for particular concern should lead courts to greater
willingness to adjudicate in that area); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) ("ITihe greater the degree of codification or
consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appro-
priate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it").
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states to follow human rights norms, the federal courts should
meet and further these obligations by adjudicating human
rights claims. Indeed, commentators have suggested that the
Barcelona Traction dictum may sanction a type of actio popu-
laris, a universal judicial vindication of universal rights.39°
C. RECOGNIZING AND JUDICIALLY ACCOMMODATING THE
HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM
The quantity and quality of attention paid to international
individual rights since World War II is staggering. Through the
aforementioned doctrines, and through diverse legal agree-
ments and developments, the protection of individual liberty
and physical integrity now dominates international law. Rather
than simply revising the substance of international law, it is
likely that the human rights and terrorism laws actually have
fundamentally altered the world legal order.
As commonly conceived, the state system derives from the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, formally ending the Thirty Years
War and medieval feudalism.391 Underlying that European war
was conflict over the centralized sovereignty of the Emperor
and Pope. This secular and spiritual dominance ceased after
the Peace of Westphalia, which, through treaty, recognized the
separation of church and state and the territorial sovereignty of
European states.392 Under the Westphalian perspective, sover-
eign states exclusively constitute the world legal order.39 3 In a
decentralized legal order, "governments are sovereign and
equal by juridical fiat, rather than by virtue of some higher au-
thority."394 International law thus has been created and en-
forced horizontally, rather than vertically, with each state
acceding to certain sovereign rules otherwise unenforceable.3 9 5
390. See 0. SCHACHTER, supra note 369, at 195-201, 340-42; Schwelb, The
Actio Popularis and International Law, [1972] 2 IsRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTs. 46, 55-
56.
391. See S. STEINBERG, THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR AND THE CONFLicT FOR
EUROPEAN HEGEMONY 1600-1660 at 75-85 (1966); Gross, The Peace of Westpha-
lia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1948).
392. Such attributes of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), reprinted in I MA-
JOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HIsTORY 7 (F. Israel ed. 1967), are described
more fully in the sources cited in note 391, supra. See also Falk, A New Para-
digm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals, 84 YALE L.J.
969, 978-91 (1975) (stating that Peace of Westphalia helped shape primary ele-
ments of modern state system).
393. See R. FALic, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDs 59 (1975).
394. Id (emphasis in original).
395. A vertical legal order may be shaped pyramidally, with a governing
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Just as the Peace of Westphalia marked "the end of [one]
epoch and the opening of another, '3 96 however, the interna-
tional status and protection afforded to individuals following
World War II arguably signify another structural or paradig-
matic revision of the world legal order. A "paradigm," accord-
ing to scientist Thomas Kuhn, "stands for the entire
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, ... shared by mem-
bers of a given community"; it alternatively denotes just "one
sort of element in that constellation, which, employed as mod-
els or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the so-
lution .... ." of remaining scientific puzzles.3 97 Drawing loosely
from Kuhn's concept, Richard Falk wrote that the time is ripe
"to give juridical shape to a new paradigm of global relations,
one that corresponds more closely than statist thinking to the
needs, trends, and values of the present state of global poli-
tics."3 9 8 Falk counseled future recognition of "the pull and
push of forces in the international legal system without losing
sight of the cumulative drift toward central guidance"3 99 and
he envisioned a return to pre-Westphalian world governance.
Although state sovereignty remains the touchstone of the
world legal order, its primacy has been diminished in the con-
text of fundamental rights. Beginning with the prosecution of
Axis leaders for domestic crimes committed under state author-
ity, international treaties diminished the authority of states, in-
dividual rulers, and other nonstate actors to commit individual
human rights violations or acts of aggression. The "pull and
push" of such legal forces revised the Westphalian apparatus.
In Kuhn's terms, the world community has reconceived the
Westphalian constellation to include the shared human rights
values. Alternatively, human rights claims may be one constel-
latory element in the Westphalian system, employed as a model
elite at the top-center; a horizontal order distributes authority equally among
actors who may minimize conflict through reciprocal patterns of self-restraint.
See R. FALK, supra note 364, at 21-52.
396. Gross, supra note 391, at 28.
397. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFC REVOLUTIONS 175 (2d ed.
1970). Such alternative definitions attempted to refine Kuhn's earlier defini-
tion of a paradigm, which referred to "universally recognized scientific
achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a com-
munity of practioners." Id- at viii.
398. Falk, supra note 392, at 992.
399. Id, (emphasis in original). The transition toward, and eventual fulfill-
ment of, central guidance, Falk argues, partly derives from the Westphalian
order's unsuitability to protect minimum standards of human rights: "Statist
interests take precedence over the pretensions of international solidarity and
concern for human rights." Falk, supra note 393, at 68.
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to reorder and solve current international disputes over funda-
mental rights. An entire paradigm shift4°° has not occurred,
and true centralized governance does not exist. It is plausible
to conclude, nevertheless, that the human rights paradigm now
overlays, or is encompassed by, the Westphalian structure.
Legal and doctrinal developments discussed in this Article have
revised the status, rights, and integrity of individuals as well as
the world legal order itself.
If the individual rights movement is now recognizable in an
international paradigm, how should domestic courts function in
relation to that paradigm? Assuming that human rights and
terrorism laws have effected a revision of world legal order, do-
mestic court jurisdiction over violations of those laws is fully le-
gitimate. In light of certain doctrinal developments, this
Article has recommended that domestic court jurisdiction is le-
gitimate over international law violations that are condemned
by substantial codification and consensus.401 A fortiori, this rec-
ommendation compels domestic jurisdiction over violations of
those specific human rights norms acknowledged to have struc-
turally altered the global legal system.
In the absence of appropriate centralized international ju-
dicial tribunals, domestic courts, including the federal judiciary,
may bridge the waning Westphalian model and the evolving
human rights paradigm. Decentralized domestic courts may fa-
cilitate this transition by enforcing the fundamental norms of
the modern legal order. Although the courts are horizontally
arranged, they may properly enforce norms emitted by central-
ized institutions, such as the U.N. and, in the case of hijacking,
the International Civil Aviation Organization. The fact that no
global civil tribunal now exists does not foreclose domestic
court jurisdiction over human rights claims; it suggests only
that, institutionally, the world has not yet fully provided
human rights enforcement machinery. In the meantime, do-
mestic courts legitimately act as double agents (dedoublement
fonctionnel) of both national and international legal orders.402
400. A "paradigm shift" refers to an entire structural and agenda revision,
"a mutation rather than a series of increments." Falk, supra note 392, at 977-
78.
401. See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
402. See generally Scelle, Redles Gdndrales de la Paix, 46 RECUEIL DE
COURS 1 358-59, 421-27 (IV 1933) (describing dual and multiple functions
played by single institutions in particular domestic and international contexts).
Of course, this Author's use of dedoublementfonctionnel refers to a domestic
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CONCLUSION
Faced with the recent reluctance of federal courts to vindi-
cate international human rights claims, this Article has demon-
strated the existence of federal question jurisdiction over such
claims. The Article identified section 1331's potential import in
human rights litigation and created a three-genus framework of
section 1331 jurisdiction. The Article then demonstrated that
various human rights claims may satisfy the requisites of those
genuses. After concluding that section 1331 jurisdiction over
human rights cases is legitimate within the United States legal
order, this Article explained why doctrinal and paradigmatic
developments within the world legal order also legitimize the
extension of federal jurisdiction over human rights cases. This
Article aims to persuade federal judges to assume jurisdiction
to vindicate federal rights in one of the most significant and
compelling legal areas of our time.
institution acting as an agent of two legal orders, rather than to an institution
playing dual functions in a single system.
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